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edited by

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CHAPTER 7

IRAN UNDER THE BŪYIDS

During the first decades of the 4th/10th century Iran was divided into three important spheres of power. The east (Transoxiana and Khurāsān) was subject to the Sāmānids, who also exerted a varying degree of authority over the provinces of Sīstān and Kirmān beyond the desert area of Dasht-i-Kavir and Dasht-i-Lūt. The Iranian highlands by the Caspian Sea were controlled by the Zaidite rulers of Ṭabaristān and by various local potentates. In the south they were ruled by ‘Abbāsīd governors directly dependent on Baghdad, whose constant ambition however was to establish themselves as independent dynastic rulers. The Sājids of Qazvīn had already succeeded in doing this by the end of the 3rd/9th century in Āzarbāijān in the northwest. The Zaidite rulers of Ṭabaristān and the other smaller princes joined the Sājids, though often involuntarily, to form a barrier effective enough to halt the westward progress of the Sāmānids. Iran’s fate for the next hundred years was to be decided in the region on the south shore of the Caspian Sea, an area barely two hundred miles long and sixty miles wide. Within a few years an entirely new power was to emerge in this vacuum, the Būyids, who were able to wrest central and southern Iran from the ‘Abbāsīds while the attention of the latter was being diverted by conflicts in Mesopotamia. Thus for the first time in Islamic history this area was released from the centralized control of Baghdad and united under the rule of an Iranian dynasty. In other words, the formation of native states, which had already been in progress for some time in eastern Iran, now began to take place in western Iran. The Būyids achieved even more than this; from the Iranian plateau they descended on Iraq and brought the caliphate itself under their domination. The Būyid period therefore also marks the opening of a new era in the history of the ‘Abbāsīd caliphate. The weakening of the central power of the caliphate, it is true, had already begun after the turn of the century; nevertheless it was the Būyids who were to stabilize the situation in Baghdad after a period of considerable confusion. The occupation of Baghdad by the Shī‘ī Būyids might well have dealt a

mortal blow to the caliphate if they had not decided, for reasons of political expediency, to countenance its continued existence, thereby assuring themselves of the possibility of using it as a political tool both at home and abroad. This gave their rule a more legitimate appearance in the eyes of the majority of their subjects, who were Sunnī, and also increased the respect in which the Būyids were held by foreign powers. Their most dangerous opponents remained the Sāmānids in the east, who in contrast were pursuing a deliberately orthodox Sunnī policy which gave them an excellent pretext for continuing their expansion westwards. The struggles which took place along the frontier between them were to affect Būyid policy for decades to come. It was from this direction too, that in the 11th century the Ghaznavids and then the Saljuqs delivered the counter-blows which first reduced and then annihilated the Būyid state.

The form of government established by the Būyids may be described with reservations as a military dictatorship. The Būyids were Dailamites and were largely dependent on soldiers drawn from their own people. The Dailamites, whose home was in the mountainous area north of Qazvīn, had a long tradition of military prowess dating back to pre-Christian times and including campaigns against Georgia as allies of the Sāsānians. Like the Turks, they already had been playing an important rôle as mercenaries in the period which preceded the emergence of the Būyids, and they had been active in Iran, Mesopotamia and even further westward. This was a factor of some importance in the rapid success of the Būyids, for it was easy to persuade the Dailamites to follow the victorious leadership of one of their own number. Their fighting methods, their strategy and their accoutrement were much the same as they had always been. Being a peasant race possessing cattle but not horses, they were infantry men. Each man was equipped with a shield, a sword and three spears, and, as Islamic sources tell us, they were able to form an impenetrable wall with their large shields when advancing in close formation. They specialized in hurling lances to which were attached burning rags soaked in crude oil. Islamic sources emphasize their hardiness, and their bravery was proverbial. On many occasions the Būyids were able to win victories although their forces were far outnumbered by their opponents. Because the Dailamites could only be employed as infantry, the Būyids were also obliged to make use of the Turks, whose mounted archers provided a tactically essential complement. In addition they also enrolled Kurdish mercen-

aries in Iran and Arabs in Mesopotamia. The combination of Dailamites and Turks as the backbone of the Būyid army soon led to serious problems. The question of the direct payment of the army out of the state treasury was at least partly solved by the introduction of a form of feudalism. Since the Būyids depended for their initial successes largely on the assistance of their own people the Dailamites, there soon grew up a sort of military aristocracy largely hereditary in character. As a result there was constant friction between them and the Turks, which in turn affected the outcome of many internal Būyid squabbles. Later the Būyids of Iran tended to rely on Dailamites while those in Iraq depended on Turkish support. In addition to this, the feudal system had grave disadvantages, and the supremacy of the military was detrimental to the civilian population. Dailamite oppression became proverbial, as a reliable witness reports.¹

The roots of this military dictatorship lie partly in the conditions under which the Būyids set up their rule and partly in the situation prevalent in many parts of Iran before they appeared on the scene. The central government was so ineffectual that the mercenaries in *Shīrāz* and *Iṣfahān* were left to themselves; consequently they could only be paid and maintained by a leader who possessed a combination of initiative, outstanding military proficiency, conviction and organizing ability. The lack of administrative experience could easily be supplemented by the co-operation of professional civil servants. As we shall see, 'Imād al-Daula, the founder of the Būyid empire, possessed all these essential qualities. In Iran he found the mood of the mercenaries ideally favourable for a take-over of power. The words attributed to the *Iṣfahān* mercenaries after the death of Mardāvīj are particularly revealing in this respect: "If we remain without a leader, we are lost."² In this mood both Turks and Dailamites embraced the Būyid's leadership; the fact that he outstripped numerous rivals is indicative of his qualities.

It lies in the nature of a military dictatorship based on a military aristocracy that attempts to ensure a strictly hereditary line of succession are fraught with difficulty. The Būyid empire was no exception, and it only succeeded in establishing a regular pattern of succession when it was already too late. The army was repeatedly to decide the matter either by an official election or simply by force of arms. Women had always held an important place in Dailamite society and they were to

¹ *Tanūkhī*, part I, p. 157.

² *Ibn al-Aṭhīr*, vol. VIII, p. 105.

wield great political influence and were even to achieve personal rule. An example is Sayyida at the end of the 4th/10th century in Ray. The unique structure of the Būyid empire gave rise to a further problem. It was from the start divided into three spheres of influence, Shīrāz, Ray and Baghdad. In consequence, questions of the unity of the empire and its government occupy a position of the greatest importance in the history of this period. From this point of view Būyid history may be divided into three sections: first, its foundation and rise; secondly, its apogee and the establishment of unity under Rukn al-Daula and ‘Aḍud al-Daula; and thirdly, the struggle for the succession of ‘Aḍud al-Daula which led in due course to the decline and final collapse of the empire.

I. FOUNDATION OF THE EMPIRE BY ‘IMĀD AL-DAULA

In the mountain fastnesses of their homeland the Dailamites had already succeeded in repelling more than a dozen Muslim attacks before the beginning of the 3rd/9th century, when they began to receive Islamic influences. Pretenders to the succession of ‘Alī, who were of the Zaidite persuasion, sought refuge amongst the Dailamites and began to proselytize them in the second half of the 3rd/9th century. But the real wave of conversion did not come until the turn of the century, when the Zaidite Imām Ḥasan al-Uṭrūsh spent a considerable length of time in the region. The Zaidite Imāms were supported by the Dailamite family of Banū Justān in their struggle for supremacy in Ṭabaristān, but at the beginning of the 4th/10th century various Dailamite and Gilān military leaders began to supplant them. It was during this turbulent and uncertain period that ‘Alī b. Būya (‘Imād al-Daula), the founder of the Būyid empire, began his career.

Our knowledge of ‘Imād al-Daula’s youth is at best fragmentary. If we accept that he died at the age of 57, he must have been born c. A.D. 891–2. It appears that, true to Dailamite tradition, he early embarked on a military career. He himself records that he was in his youth employed at the court of the Sāmānid prince Naṣr b. Aḥmad (301/913–331/943) apparently in the prince’s closest entourage. The next step in his advancement occurred when he entered the service of Mākān b. Kākī, either at the suggestion of Naṣr or of his own free will. Mākān was a member of a princely Gilān family. He had espoused the cause of the ‘Alid ruler of Ṭabaristān and in 924 had become governor of Gurgān. After the death of the former ruler he had made successful

overture to the Sāmānids and had been appointed governor of the disputed territory of Ray. It is conceivable that ‘Imād al-Daula joined Mākān at this date (928). He must certainly have occupied a high position in Mākān’s army, for he was able to invite his two younger brothers, Ḥasan (the future Rukn al-Daula) and Aḥmad (later known as Mu‘izz al-Daula), to join him and to procure for them commissions in the army and in his own retinue. Ḥasan was then about 30 years old, Aḥmad a boy of just 13. Two years later, Mākān took a politically fatal step when he decided to attack the Sāmānids in Khurāsān; he managed to occupy Nīshāpūr for a time, but was then defeated by Mardāvīj, another Gilān prince, and forced to abandon Ṭabaristān. ‘Imād al-Daula was quick to join the victor’s side along with his brothers, and he entered the service of Mardāvīj just when the latter was preparing to subjugate the territory south of the Alburz range as far as Qazvīn, with every intention of proceeding to the conquest of other provinces further south. Mardāvīj soon recognized the capabilities of the Būyid, shortly afterwards entrusting him with the administration of the important town of Karaj, which had been the seat of the Dulafid princes. The itineraries of various geographers would seem to indicate that Karaj was in the neighbourhood of present-day Bahrāmābād, sixty miles southeast of Hamadān. It was situated at an important centre of communications, being at the junction of the north–south route from Ray to Ahvāz and the south-east route from Hamadān to Iṣfahān. After the overthrow of the Dulafids at the end of the 3rd/9th century, a vacuum had occurred here which the ‘Abbāsīd governors of Iṣfahān and Shīrāz had not been able to dispel. The appointment of ‘Imād al-Daula as governor of Karaj may well have taken place in Ṭabaristān, since on his journey to his post he passed through Ray, where Vushmgīr, one of Mardāvīj’s brothers, resided, as did the vizier al-‘Amīd, whose son was later to play an important part in connection with Rukn al-Daula. Meanwhile Mardāvīj decided to terminate ‘Imād al-Daula’s appointment, probably because he wanted to administer Karaj himself. However, while in Ray ‘Imād al-Daula won the favour of the vizier and from him discovered the prince’s plan. In order to forestall his dismissal he speedily left Ray and took over control of Karaj.

The political situation at Karaj was confused. There seems to have been a small garrison of Dailamite soldiers, but these had been left to their own devices and were bored with inactivity. The surrounding mountains were in the hands of the Khurramites, adherents of a

religious and political sect combining Shī'ī and Zoroastrian elements. 'Imād al-Daula set about their subjugation systematically and seized a series of fortresses, which enhanced his reputation, and provided him with valuable spoils. Soon the entire region was in his hands. The riches he acquired from the Khurramites enabled him to hire more mercenaries, thereby building up his position. His qualities as a born leader were proved by the failure of Mardāvīj's attempts to stir up the soldiers in Karaj against him. Soon 'Imād al-Daula was in a position to contemplate an extension of his power. But at the same time he was obliged to prepare his army for the likelihood of an impending attack by Mardāvīj, who was bound sooner or later to try to put down his rebellious viceroy. 'Imād al-Daula now made the capture of nearby Iṣfahān his ambition, and there met with an unexpectedly brilliant success. The opposing army, though far outnumbering his own, came over with astonishing alacrity to his side when he appeared before the walls of the city. This in turn enhanced his wealth and his popularity with the mercenaries. He failed, however, to come to terms with the governor of Iṣfahān and, unable to establish the legality of his position, he abandoned the city in the face of Mardāvīj and, abandoning Karaj too, marched on the important town of Arrajān, between Khūzistān and Fārs, which was ruled by the same governor as Iṣfahān. Here the same pattern of victory and spoils was repeated.

His march on Arrajān was probably in the nature of a foray, but he was doubtless already entertaining the prospect of setting up a kingdom in southern Iran. He therefore only spent the winter in Arrajān, and in spring 321/933 set off on a new campaign. In Fārs he ran into an ally in the person of Zaid b. 'Alī al-Naubandagānī, who possessed large estates in the mountains north of Kāzarūn and was on bad terms with the authorities in Baghdad. Judging by his name he may have been a descendant of 'Alī, who hoped that the Būyid would provide military support for the advancement of his religious and political ambitions. Meanwhile Yāqūt, the governor of Iṣfahān and Fārs, had replaced Mardāvīj as 'Imad al-Daula's most immediate antagonist. A series of skirmishes culminated in a decisive battle from which the Būyid emerged victorious. By treating them well, he also won the vanquished over to his side. The way was now open to Shīrāz. In 322/May or June 934 he entered the capital city of Fārs, which was to remain in the uninterrupted possession of the Būyids until 1062.

After the capture of Shīrāz 'Imād al-Daula strove to gain recognition

by the caliph in order to forestall the claims of Mardāvīj. This time he was successful, though he had no intention of paying the requisite tribute. He accepted the insignia of his office as viceroy from the caliph's emissary, but then delayed the emissary with promises for two years, until the latter finally died in Shīrāz without having achieved his mission of obtaining the tribute. This episode, insignificant in itself, prefigured the attitude which was to condition the subsequent policy of the Būyids towards the 'Abbāsīd caliphate. 'Imād al-Daula and his successors were by tradition Shī'ī and of the Zaidite persuasion. It should be recalled that the Dailamites had been converted to Islam by Zaidite missionaries. Later the Būyids were to bend towards Twelver Shī'ism, and even the Ismā'īlīs were later accepted for brief periods at their court. Their Shī'ī beliefs may have been varied in complexion, but they certainly had no religious reason for seeking the caliph's approval, let alone for setting themselves up as protectors of the caliphate after their capture of Baghdad. But whatever the arguments put forward to explain the moderation of the Būyids' policy towards the caliph and whatever they themselves asserted at the time, there can be no doubt that 'Imād al-Daula's decision to acknowledge at least formally the caliph's supremacy was to have a very considerable influence on future developments. His once valuable ally in Naubandagān meanwhile disappeared from the scene, as did a later Zaidite pretender who had accompanied Mu'izz al-Daula to Baghdad but who then returned to Ṭabaristān to further his own cause.

Mardāvīj was still 'Imād al-Daula's bitterest opponent. In order to sever any possible Būyid links with Iraq, and doubtless also to preclude the westward expansion of the Būyid Empire, Mardāvīj now embarked on a campaign against Khūzistān. He then came to an agreement with the caliph, thus forcing 'Imād al-Daula to recognize Mardāvīj's formal superiority. But this state of affairs came to an abrupt end with the murder of Mardāvīj in January 935. 'Imād al-Daula then began to press his claims to Khūzistān with the caliph, probably building on his position as second only to Mardāvīj. He occupied 'Askar Mukram and then came to terms with the caliph, who confirmed him in the possession of Fārs and gave Khūzistān to Yāqūt, the former governor of Fārs.

The assassination of Mardāvīj in Iṣfahān, followed by the dispersal of his Turkish mercenaries, led to the collapse of Ziyārid rule in central Iran. Two of his Turkish officers, Tuzun and Bajkam, went to Baghdad,

both reaching high position. A large number of the Turkish mercenaries joined 'Imād al-Daula in Shīrāz, whereupon the latter felt that the opportunity had come to incorporate in his growing empire Iṣfahān, scene of his earliest triumphs. The command of this campaign he entrusted to his younger brother Ḥasan (Rukn al-Daula), who had distinguished himself in the battles in Fārs and had then been sent as a hostage to the court of Mardāvīj at the time of his brother's truce with him, but had escaped at the time of Mardāvīj's assassination by bribing his keepers. Rukn al-Daula won an easy victory at Iṣfahān, particularly because Vuṣhmگیر, Mardāvīj's brother, was involved in engagements with the Sāmānids, who were again attacking Ray. Owing to internal discords, however, his triumph over the Ziyārīds proved short-lived. Vuṣhmگیر took Iṣfahān three years later and Rukn al-Daula was forced to retreat to Fārs. He set up camp before the gates of Iṣṭakhr and there awaited the moment for renewed action.

Soon after the capture of Iṣfahān 'Imād al-Daula sent his youngest brother Aḥmad (Mu'izz al-Daula) to Kirmān, a province which since 862 had been in the hands of the Ṣaffārīds. Shortly before the Būyids established themselves in Shīrāz, Abū 'Alī b. Ilyās of Khurāsān had driven the Ṣaffārīds out of Kirmān (from now on they were confined to Sīstān) and had forced them to recognize Sāmānid supremacy in 928. During 'Imād al-Daula's campaigns in Fārs he had made a vain attempt to take Shīrāz in a surprise attack. After the assassination of Mardāvīj 'Imād al-Daula seized the opportunity of expanding his realms towards the southeast. Rukn al-Daula was already in Iṣfahān; Mu'izz al-Daula however was still waiting for a kingdom. He had distinguished himself during the battle which had decided the struggle for Fārs by his intrepid heroism, and now Kirmān fell swiftly before him until he met resistance from the Qufṣ (Kūfichīs) and Balūchīs. He was then recalled by 'Imād al-Daula and sent to Iṣṭakhr, there to await further calls to duty. Nevertheless his campaign in Kirmān resulted in the permanent recognition of Būyid authority by the Banū Ilyās. The province was not to be annexed directly for several decades.

'Imād al-Daula had already obtained a foothold in Khūzistān, the valuable province linking Fārs and Iraq by occupying the strategically vital town of Arrajān. The Barīdīs, the virtual rulers of the province, now turned to the Būyids for help against their overlord the caliph in Baghdad, and 'Imād al-Daula saw in this a golden opportunity for renewing his old plans of conquering their territory. He despatched

the waiting Mu'izz al-Daula to Ahvāz, and the latter soon ousted the Barīdīs and undertook repeated campaigns against Baghdad, where the 'Abbāsids were involved in their own internal disputes. In 945 he entered the city, and the caliph bestowed the honorary title Mu'izz al-Daula on him and the titles 'Imād al-Daula and Rukn al-Daula on his brothers in Iran. He also became the de facto successor to the senior amirate (*amīr al-umarā'*). In Mesopotamia he found himself confronted by the Barīdīs, who had retreated to Baṣra and Wāsiṭ, second, by a small but impregnable amirate in the marsh between the two cities, and, most seriously, by the Ḥamdānids in Mosul who, after a vain attempt to expel the Būyids from Baghdad in 946, retired to northern Mesopotamia, where their opposition was to be overcome thirty years later by 'Aḍud al-Daula. In 947 Mu'izz al-Daula subdued the Barīdīs. The small marshland amirate alone remained, defying the Būyids for almost a century.

Meanwhile, in central Iran, Rukn al-Daula was favoured by fortune as was his brother in Iraq. Clever politics of alliance enabled him to play off the Ziyārīds against the Sāmānīds and especially their governors in Khurāsān, the Banū Muḥtāj. Unlike Mu'izz al-Daula, Rukn al-Daula did not receive support from Shīrāz, and his progress was in consequence more erratic. About 940 he recaptured Iṣfahān and then defeated Vushmgīr and occupied Ray with the help of Ibn Muḥtāj, the governor of Khurāsān. However, he suffered a severe setback in the very year in which Mu'izz al-Daula took Baghdad, for in the course of one ambitious campaign Ibn Muḥtāj seized the whole of central Iran. Rukn al-Daula was not able to return to Ray until 335/946–7 when the Būyids had made sure of Iraq. He then achieved the annexation of Ṭabaristān and Gurgān. His defeat of the Musāfirīds of Āzarbāijān at Qazvīn settled this disputed frontier though spasmodic struggles against the Ziyārīds and the Sāmānīds continued for many years.

By the spring of 948 the boundaries of the Būyid Empire in Iran and Mesopotamia were clearly defined, apart from some small and unimportant areas later added to it. Little over a dozen years had sufficed to establish in the greater part of Iran a power which was to exert a decisive influence on the 'Abbāsīd caliphate for more than a century. Yet it was neither centrally organized nor provided with a strict order of succession. This lack of centralization it shared with other powers of the period. Thus the Ḥamdānīd state in northern Mesopotamia was

divided between Mosul and Aleppo, neither centre taking pride of place. The Būyid state had more in common with the Ḥamdānids than they had with their eastern neighbours the Sāmānids. In both the Būyid and the Ḥamdānid state there were always at least two rival rulers whose interests did not coincide, the only bond between them being that of blood. The relations between the joint rulers of the Būyid empire were more complicated than in the case of the Ḥamdānids, whose rule depended on the Aleppo–Mosul axis. From the very beginning Būyid leadership centred on 'Imād al-Daula, the eldest of the three brothers. Rukn al-Daula seems to have had free rein in Iṣfahān and Ray. His coins bear witness to absolute authority in his own territory, his name alone appearing beside that of the caliph. This was true also of coins of his elder brother minted in Fārs, proving that the two regions enjoyed equal and independent importance. The youngest of the three, Mu'izz al-Daula, who was only twenty when he occupied Kirmān, acted under the orders of 'Imād al-Daula, and when he did not fulfil the latter's requirements he was recalled to Fārs and only later placed in command of the Khūzistān campaign. His dependence on his brother entitled him to support from Shīrāz but limited his personal authority in the territories he conquered to that of a governor or representative (*nā'ib*) of 'Imād al-Daula. His coins therefore bear three names – those of the caliph and 'Imād al-Daula as well as his own. In the list of dignitaries which al-Ṣūlī gives for the caliphate of Muttaqī (940–4) in his work *Akḥbār al-Rādī wa'l-Muttaqī billāh* 'Imād al-Daula appears as governor of Fārs and Khūzistān (he had not yet conquered Iraq) whereas Mu'izz al-Daula, being only his brother's representative in Khūzistān, is not even mentioned. Rukn al-Daula on the other hand, as would be expected, appeared in the list as the independent governor of Iṣfahān (*al-Jibāl*).¹

Was Mu'izz al-Daula entirely subordinate to his eldest brother? When they met in Arrajān in 948 'Imād al-Daula is said by Miskawaih to have declared: "Mu'izz al-Daula and Rukn al-Daula are my brothers by blood, my sons by upbringing and my creatures with regard to their power." He certainly regarded himself as senior amīr, although Mu'izz al-Daula, as ruler of Baghdad, *de facto* held the title, yet he never claimed to be supreme ruler of the whole Būyid empire. Such a connection of the senior amirate arose only after his death. It is hardly likely that Mu'izz al-Daula had no freedom of action; for instance, the

¹ Ṣūlī, p. 284.

deposition of al-Muktafī and the installation of al-Muṭī' in 946 was undoubtedly his decision, though it was in accordance with his brother's policy towards the caliphate. The problem of the succession, meanwhile, was to remain in abeyance until the approaching death of the childless 'Imād al-Daula dictated a provisional solution. He named his nephew 'Aḍud al-Daula as his successor to the throne of Shīrāz. By this decision the flaw inherent in the question of succession in the Būyid empire was perpetuated; a time would come when none of the Būyid rulers had sufficient moral and military authority to assume responsibility for the whole empire in time of need.

'Imād al-Daula died in Shīrāz in December 949 at the age of fifty-seven and was buried in a tomb which was to become the mausoleum of the Būyid dynasty (*Turbat Banī Būya*). He left no other monument of artistic interest, for he was essentially a man of action, a brilliant commander in the field who also knew how to win the favours of the great and turn their influence to his own advantage. His economic policy was in character, as well as being typical of his time. In the first place, he evaded the traditional payment of 800,000 *dīnārs* annual tribute to the caliph; in the second place, he filled his treasury with enforced gifts (*muṣādara*) from his wealthier subjects; thirdly, and most characteristically, he confiscated land, giving it in fief to his officers in lieu of payment. The result of this policy was to lighten the financial burden of the state but at the cost of a fatal and long-lasting impoverishment of the country. Soldiers make bad landlords, and by the end of his reign his officers were almost as discontented as the dispossessed peasantry. The date at which this form of payment began is uncertain, though it must have been earlier than the conquest of Iraq, since Mu'izz al-Daula would not have introduced it there without a precedent in Iran. In the early period of 'Imād al-Daula's rule in Fārs the traditional method of payment seems to have been the rule, and this would account for the almost legendary reports related by Miskawaih and later chroniclers of how, after the capture of Shīrāz, he discovered the hidden treasure amassed by his predecessor Yāqūt and used it to pay his army, his own treasury being at the time empty. Such accounts may well contain an element of truth. If so, they must have been regarded as further proof of 'Imād al-Daula's "good fortune"; the meteoric rise of a humble officer of Dailamite origin was bound to make a deep impression on his contemporaries regardless of the means whereby it was achieved. We will have to come back later to the legend that the Būyids were of royal

stock. In Ibn al-Athīr this legend is combined with another, according to which the father of the three brothers was told by an astrologer that his sons could expect a great future; they were three branches from each of which further shoots would spring. The legend seems to have arisen *c.* 936–7, at a time when 'Imād al-Daula could still have been hoping to produce an heir and Rukn al-Daula had already taken Iṣfahān. Mu'izz al-Daula was then awaiting further orders in Iṣṭakhr after his misfortune in Kirmān, and he does not in fact appear by name in the legend.

The chroniclers all pass favourable judgement on 'Imād al-Daula. Indeed the fearless and outspoken Ibn al-Athīr declares that he was mild (*ḥalīm*) and clever (*'āqil*) and imputes political skill to him both as a ruler and as an overlord. To a great extent we may concur with his opinion, though it is questionable whether the Būyids could have retained control for more than a century over the territory they conquered had not rulers like Rukn al-Daula and 'Aḍud al-Daula appeared after him to consolidate the Būyid empire internally and externally. 'Imād al-Daula was himself too concerned with founding the empire to be able to mould its future development with long-sighted policies. His despatch of Rukn al-Daula to Iṣfahān was intended to provide the latter with territory of his own rather than to achieve a deliberate rounding-off of the Būyid frontiers, and the failure to regulate the latter's official relationship to the senior amirate was to have evil consequences later when Rukn al-Daula's son, Fakhr al-Daula, made the first moves that were ultimately to lead to the disintegration of the empire. Similarly his despatch of Mu'izz al-Daula to Kirmān and Khūzistān was primarily designed to protect the eastern and western flanks of his own central province, Fārs. This, rather than his youth, was the reason why Mu'izz al-Daula was given only titular sovereignty in the west. His subsequent conquest of Iraq was carried out without his brother's instructions and was not supported by him, although it was tolerated. The Būyids were in fact never really at home in Baghdad. Mu'izz al-Daula almost returned to Ahvāz "because of its better climate" and his immediate successors never took up permanent residence in Baghdad. 'Imād al-Daula's lack of interest in Baghdad and in the position of senior amir is for its part borne out by the fact that he never visited it, to be confirmed in office by the caliph, let alone made it his own capital. The most westerly point he ever reached was 'Askar Mukram, north of Ahvāz, which he occupied for a short time

in the spring of 935 after the death of Mardāvīj. ‘Imād al-Daula may therefore accurately be said to have founded the Būyid Empire, but not to have moulded it into shape.

II. THE BŪYIDS AT THE HEIGHT OF THEIR POWER

Rukn al-Daula and ‘Aḍud al-Daula

‘Imād al-Daula died just under two years after the conference of Arrajān where questions concerning the future position of Iraq with regard to the other parts of the Būyid empire had been discussed. Some months before, he had resolved the question of his succession by summoning Fanā-Khusrau (‘Aḍud al-Daula), the eldest son of Rukn al-Daula, to Shīrāz and nominating him as his successor. Fanā-Khusrau was barely thirteen years old, but was the only Būyid prince of the second generation to have grown up to that age. This decision shows that ‘Imād al-Daula had every intention of preserving the two or even threefold division of the empire. He does not appear to have contemplated the alternative solutions of adding Fārs to the territories of Rukn al-Daula or of nominating Mu‘izz al-Daula, his viceroy and representative in the west, to the overlordship of Fārs, Khūzistān and Iraq. He does not seem to have attached any great importance to the question of who was to inherit the title of senior amīr, though he must have realized that during the minority of his adoptive heir the latter’s father would enjoy the title. Rukn al-Daula was indeed quick to seize the senior amirate, particularly as his son’s position in Shīrāz was at first by no means certain. At the news of his brother’s death he promptly went to Shīrāz and spent no less than nine months there, despite the fact that his own province was still being threatened by the Sāmānids. His efforts had the practical result of restoring the unity of the empire. Fanā-Khusrau discovered that he was not the ruler of an independent province but that he occupied in Fārs a position towards Rukn al-Daula similar to that which Mu‘izz al-Daula had occupied towards ‘Imād al-Daula; in other words, he was his father’s viceroy and representative, as is borne out by the existence of coins bearing his name *and* that of his father. No opposition was offered in Baghdad to this reorganization of the empire. Mu‘izz al-Daula had sent troops to Shīrāz to ensure ‘Aḍud al-Daula’s accession, and he accepted his brother’s new position without demur, carrying out the *khutba* in his name and altering the design of his coinage accordingly. The only change, as far as Iraq and

Khūzistān were concerned, was that Rukn al-Daula was now in ‘Imād al-Daula’s place. Nevertheless the changeover at Shīrāz was not entirely without friction. Shortly after his accession, the new ruler of Shīrāz was honoured by the caliph with the title “‘Aḍud al-Daula”. The earliest evidence we have for it occurs on a coin now in the Berlin Numismatic Collection, which bears the date 340/951–2. As he was the Būyid representative in Baghdad, Mu‘izz al-Daula would have had the last say in the negotiations with the caliph, who alone could bestow such titles. The question of a suitable title was thus the last opportunity for raising a protest, and sure enough, it soon became evident that the changes in the east did not meet with complete approbation in Baghdad. From the *Rusūm dār al-khilāfa* “The Etiquette of the Court of the Caliph” by Hilāl al-Ṣābi’ we learn that it was initially intended that the title “Tāj al-Daula” should be conferred on Fanā-Khusrau, but Mu‘izz al-Daula not agreeing with this, the title “‘Aḍud al-Daula” was chosen instead. The original choice seemed to Mu‘izz al-Daula to anticipate Fanā-Khusrau’s claim to the senior amirate, and he therefore opposed it. Certainly “Tāj” (crown) differed from all the earlier titles borne by the Būyids, which had all been based on the epithets “pillar” (‘Imād, Rukn) or “strength” (Mu‘izz). Mu‘izz al-Daula considered that, in the event of Rukn al-Daula’s death, the leadership of the Būyid Empire should pass to him by virtue of that very principle of seniority which Rukn al-Daula had just asserted in his own favour. In fact his own death during Rukn al-Daula’s lifetime exempted him from pursuing any such claim. The disagreement over the title did however result in laying the foundations of an increasing estrangement between Baghdad and Ray/Shīrāz, which was to become open after Mu‘izz al-Daula’s death, and which finally led to the exclusion of the Baghdad branch from the succession. Provisionally, however, the seeds of this controversy were to some extent concealed by the lavish gifts which Rukn al-Daula sent from Shīrāz to Baghdad and which may well have had a direct connection with the vexed question of the title. In the eyes of Miskawaih, who was on the side of his patron ‘Aḍud al-Daula, and who was out to justify the latter’s claims to suzerainty, there was no doubt whatsoever that Rukn al-Daula had been officially declared senior amir by the caliph himself.¹ It was to be of decisive importance for the future that through Rukn al-Daula’s assumption of the senior amirate the centre of the empire shifted from Fārs to Northern Iran.

¹ Miskawaih, vol. II, p. 120.

Whereas the Būyid hold on Fārs had long been assured and Būyid rule in Iraq was well on the way towards consolidation, Rukn al-Daula's hold on his own province was still far from secure. Now, as senior amīr and eldest Būyid, he was able to turn his moral claims to support from the rest of the empire into official obligations, and in consequence he was repeatedly assisted in the struggles of the next few decades by military support from Mu'izz al-Daula, who was thereby compelled to forgo pressing tasks of his own, for in Mesopotamia the Ḥamdānids of Mosul were still a source of constant danger to Būyid supremacy. Strangely enough we do not hear of any support from 'Aḍud al-Daula until later, when he fought a diversionary campaign into Khurāsān during the Sāmānid onslaught of 356/966–7. This was his first sign of military activity. Fārs was an oasis of peace; it was not attacked, nor did it start any offensive, and its young ruler could grow accustomed to the tasks of government undisturbed and emerge as the great monarch who was later to play such an important part in the history of Iran.

Rukn al-Daula meanwhile was being constantly assailed from within and without. During his absence in Shīrāz for the enthronement of 'Aḍud al-Daula, the Sāmānid governor of Khurāsān overran Jibāl; it was providential for Rukn al-Daula that the governor's sudden death halted this advance. In 342/955–6 he was forced to sign a humiliating treaty with the Sāmānids, followed by a second the same year. These conflicts also resulted in Khurāsān's virtual independence from the Sāmānids, which was to last twelve years and allow Rukn al-Daula to advance to the Caspian Sea, annex the henceforth tributary states of Ṭabaristān and Gurgān, and receive the recognition of Bīsutūn b. Vushmgīr. In 361/971–2 he was in a position to sign a more favourable treaty with the Sāmānids, though his pride still had to suffer the humiliation of paying tribute.

The end of Rukn al-Daula's chequered career was overshadowed by the insubordination of 'Aḍud al-Daula concerning claims to Iraq. The Mesopotamian Būyids were facing problems similar to those of Rukn al-Daula in northern Iran, although their rule was less urgently threatened than was the case in Ray and Iṣfahān. In Mesopotamia the Ḥamdānids provided this threat, and political changes on its frontiers could easily have had a disastrous effect. Such changes were lurking on the horizon when, in 967, Mu'izz al-Daula died in the midst of a campaign against the Shāhīnids in the Mesopotamian marshlands. Just before this he had taken 'Umān, which could command the Persian

Gulf, with the help of troops from Fārs. This success was however of little consequence for his larger Mesopotamian policies. It was at this time that Saif al-Daula died in Aleppo, and with him the chief bastion against Constantinople disappeared. This was followed by Byzantine advances in Syria. The Būyids were forced to act. The Islamic world would be threatened by dire perils if they failed to take action. But Mu'izz al-Daula's son and successor, 'Izz al-Daula Bakhtiyār, contented himself with half-measures; an army of the faithful was assembled to wage the Holy War but never marched – its presence merely aggravated the state of tension. It should be noted that these events coincided with the invasion of Egypt by the Fātimids from North Africa.

Mu'izz al-Daula in Baghdad was too concerned with home problems to pay much attention to the changes taking place in northern Syria. The traditional antagonism between the Turkish and Dailamite elements in his army was even more bitter in Baghdad than in the rest of the empire. For more than a century the majority of the caliph's mercenaries had consisted of Turks, but with the Būyid conquest Dailamites began to usurp their privileges. The Turks, however, resisted them. Indeed Mu'izz al-Daula's chief commander, Sebük-Tegin, was himself a Turk. A further reason for the antagonism was religion. The Dailamī were Shī'ī, the Turks Sunnī. Mu'izz al-Daula at first alienated the Turks, but then succeeded in working out a policy of compromise, his concern for the continuation of which is clearly discernible in the political testament which he left his son and successor 'Izz al-Daula and which is recorded by Miskawaih. He specifically recommended that Sebük-Tegin be retained in office and insisted that Turkish claims should receive fair consideration. Two other urgent problems were also dealt with in this testament. One concerned Būyid policy towards the Ḥamdānids, the other advocated the recognition of Rukn al-Daula's supremacy. The young prince was also enjoined to respect and honour his elder cousin, 'Aḍud al-Daula.

At first 'Izz al-Daula followed his father's advice. He continued the campaign against the Shāhīnids in the marshlands, which had come to a halt with his father's death, but victory eluded him. He ignored what was happening on the Byzantine frontier, declaring this to be a matter for the caliph. Indeed when in 971 the Byzantine army penetrated deep into northern Mesopotamia, he did not even return to Baghdad. The volunteer force assembled to defend the faith now became the nucleus of a personal army in the hands of Sebük-Tegin, who felt himself

slighted by ‘Izz al-Daula and increasingly driven to oppose him. In 973 ‘Izz al-Daula, against the advice left by his father, undertook an expedition against Mosul in order to avert an impending financial crisis. The result was a complete fiasco – the Ḥamdānids marched on Baghdad and it appears that Sebük-Tegin was in secret collusion with them, hoping thereby to overthrow the Būyids in Iraq. ‘Izz al-Daula now resolved to confiscate the Turkish fiefs in order to overcome his financial straits, and with this end in view advanced on Khūzistān, where most of these fiefs were situated, at the same time declaring Sebük-Tegin dismissed. The latter rallied the forces loyal to himself while ‘Izz al-Daula moved to Wāsiṭ and there entrenched himself. He scornfully rejected Sebük-Tegin’s offer to relinquish Baghdad while retaining southern Iraq, whereupon the rebellious Turk marched on Wāsiṭ and laid siege to it. ‘Izz al-Daula’s fate might well have been sealed had not reinforcements come to his aid from the eastern territories of the empire.

The campaign to relieve Wāsiṭ was entrusted to ‘Aḍud al-Daula. For nearly twenty years he had ruled in peace. He had helped Mu‘izz al-Daula capture ‘Umān and then promptly had marched on Kirmān, which had once again become the scene of internal conflicts between the Banū Ilyās. The province was now for the first time directly annexed by the Būyids and Abu’l-Fawāris (Sharaf al-Daula), the seven-year-old son of ‘Aḍud al-Daula, was nominally appointed viceroy. These new conquests to the south and east had made Fārs doubly secure, and ‘Aḍud al-Daula could now concentrate his undivided attention on the west. His father’s decision to entrust him with the relief of ‘Izz al-Daula could scarcely have been more propitious. Since his cousin’s accession, he had been viewing the situation in Iraq with growing concern, for as future senior amīr he had more than a casual interest in preserving and strengthening Būyid rule there. He was certainly already contemplating the removal of the Baghdad line because of its proven inability to govern, and this brought him into conflict with his father, who wished to uphold the Iraq branch of the family at all costs. ‘Izz al-Daula had faithfully carried out his father’s policy in this respect and had unquestioningly recognized Rukn al-Daula’s senior amīrate, but his attitude towards ‘Aḍud al-Daula was more complex. The roots of his ambivalent attitude lay in the problem of the rights of succession to the title, discussed above. ‘Aḍud al-Daula had granted asylum to a brother of ‘Izz al-Daula who had instigated a rebellion in Baṣra and had been driven

to flight. 'Izz al-Daula responded by obstructing the activities of 'Aḍud al-Daula's agents who were in Baghdad to purchase various requirements for his army and court. 'Aḍud al-Daula thereupon seized the opportunity afforded by Mu'izz al-Daula's death of occupying 'Umān and incorporating it in Fārs. These relatively trifling signs of enmity suddenly assumed a new complexion when 'Izz al-Daula ran into serious difficulties and found himself entirely dependent on help from the east. 'Aḍud al-Daula did indeed comply with his father's order to march on Wāsiṭ but he protracted his journey in the hope that his cousin would in the meantime be overpowered, thus leaving the way open for him. But 'Izz al-Daula held out, and 'Aḍud al-Daula found himself reluctantly obliged to reinstate him in Baghdad. There an army mutiny gave 'Aḍud al-Daula the opportunity for which he had been longing. He deposed his hated and despised cousin and assumed power himself. But this action brought him the strong disapproval of his father, who, invoking a pledge given to Mu'izz al-Daula, categorically forbade the exclusion of the Baghdad line. An offer by his son to pay him tribute for the possession of Iraq was promptly rejected. After numerous exchanges between Baghdad and Ray 'Aḍud al-Daula was constrained to return to Shīrāz empty-handed. The sole achievements of his intervention in Iraq were the overthrow of Sebük-Tegin's uprising (the latter had died during the siege of Wāsiṭ) and the provisional retention of his supremacy in Iraq by naming 'Izz al-Daula as his viceroy and leaving one of his own most trusted officers in Baghdad as commander-in-chief of the army. 'Izz al-Daula, however, was so certain of support in Ray that he immediately reverted to the status quo after 'Aḍud al-Daula's departure. He was equally confident that the other powers in Mesopotamia were behind him. Indeed both the Ḥamdānids and the Shāhīnids in the marshlands realized that they fared better when there was a weak Būyid in Baghdad. 'Aḍud al-Daula had demonstrated by his admittedly few but successful undertakings that he was a ruler who had to be taken seriously.

On his return to Shīrāz, 'Aḍud al-Daula must have realized that his intervention in Baghdad had been over-hasty. His prime aim, no doubt, had been to consolidate Būyid rule in Iraq, but at the same time he had not been able to persuade his father to alter the structure of the empire. Now, after this fiasco, he was actually in danger of losing his claim to the succession to the empire as a whole. As the eldest son, and as ruler of the important province of Fārs, he had hitherto been in a position

to assume that one day he would succeed his father as senior amīr, even though this actually had never been formulated in so many words. But now his relationship to his father had become decidedly clouded, and there was a very real threat that the latter might decide the question of the succession in a new and completely unforeseen way. It was at this juncture that Abu'l-Faṭḥ b. al-'Amīd, Rukn al-Daula's vizier, came to his assistance by acting as mediator and arranging a meeting between the two princes in Iṣfahān in January 976. At this encounter Rukn al-Daula appeared in a conciliatory mood and named his son as his successor on the throne, on two conditions: his rule over Ray and Hamadān would have to be indirect, since Ray would go to his second son, Fakhr al-Daula, and Hamadān would be inherited by his third son, Mu'ayyad al-Daula. Both however would have to recognize 'Aḍud al-Daula as senior amīr. In other words the latter would exert direct rule only over Fārs; no mention was made in this settlement of Iraq, nor did 'Izz al-Daula take part in the meeting. It appears that it was tacitly assumed that no regulations would succeed in altering the relationship of Iraq to the eastern provinces of the empire, and that in any case 'Izz al-Daula would duly recognize 'Aḍud al-Daula's supremacy as he had Rukn al-Daula's. 'Izz al-Daula had already been acquainted with this possibility by his father's will, and Rukn al-Daula was justified in hoping that loyalty would be preserved in Baghdad and that no steps would be taken there to alter its traditional dependence on Ray, or rather on Shīrāz. On this point he was however to be proved mistaken. He died shortly after the meeting and settlement, in September 976, and the disintegration of the empire promptly began. 'Izz al-Daula refused obedience to the new senior amīr, expressing this outwardly by the new titles conferred on himself by the caliph, proceedings described by Hilāl al-Ṣābi'. Moreover the caliph also gave him one of his daughters in marriage and thereby declared his assent to 'Izz al-Daula's policy towards the eastern provinces.

It is scarcely probable that Rukn al-Daula's settlement was the result of his own free and unimpeded decision, stemming as it did from a mistaken estimate of future developments. When, on his accession in 949, he had drawn up his first settlement, the situation in Baghdad had been a very different one, but in the meantime 'Izz al-Daula had given ample proof of his incapacity, and the Baghdad viziers were no longer men like Muhallabī, completely and unconditionally loyal to their master. Either Rukn al-Daula was inadequately informed about the

changes in Mesopotamian internal and foreign policy, or it was the obstinacy of old age which led him to uphold on principle the settlement drawn up for Iraq in 949. Certainly these were all factors in play at the time, but none was as decisive as the political duplicity of the vizier Abu'l-Fath b. al-'Amīd, who had succeeded his father in that position some years previously. In 974 he had been sent to accompany 'Aḍud al-Daula to Iraq to quell the revolt against the Būyids, and it was there that he began to play his double game; on the one hand he went to Ray as 'Aḍud al-Daula's emissary with the mission of persuading the senior amīr to agree to the deposition of 'Izz al-Daula, on the other he cultivated close ties with 'Izz al-Daula and with the caliph, and was even toying with the idea of moving permanently to Baghdad and of becoming vizier there. In Ray he succeeded in bringing about the reconciliation between his master and 'Aḍud al-Daula. It was undoubtedly due to his exertions that Iraq retained its formal independence in the new order of accession in accordance with the wishes of the Baghdad Būyid and the traditional policy of Rukn al-Daula. The prompt deposition and murder of the vizier following Rukn al-Daula's death was the foreseeable and virtually inevitable consequence. A new imperial policy was now under way, and it needed new men to carry it out.

With the death of his father, the way to Baghdad was open, and 'Aḍud al-Daula, now senior amīr, began his preparations for the campaign while 'Izz al-Daula assembled his confederates in readiness for the coming attack. In the spring of 977 'Izz al-Daula was defeated in a decisive encounter in *Khūzistān* and withdrew to *Wāsiṭ*, where he was able to form a new army. But the trial of strength was not in the end to be resumed, for after long drawn-out negotiations 'Aḍud al-Daula granted him freedom of passage to Syria, the one condition being that he was not to make any alliances with the *Ḥamdānids*. When, in spite of this condition, he allied himself with *Abū Taghlib*, his fate was sealed. They were defeated at *Sāmarrā* in the spring of 978, and 'Izz al-Daula, taken prisoner, was put to death with his cousin's consent. 'Aḍud al-Daula then proceeded to conquer the whole of northern Mesopotamia, leaving only the *Ḥamdānids* of Aleppo as an independent though tributary power. *Abū Taghlib* for his part was killed while attempting to re-establish himself in Syria. Some of the sons of 'Izz al-Daula went over to the *Fāṭimids* and the rest were captured and imprisoned in a fortress in *Fārs*. Next, 'Aḍud al-Daula

cleared Mesopotamia of Bedouin and Kurdish marauding bands, not sparing lives and using the harshest form of coercion. This task completed, he turned to deal with the former allies of 'Izz al-Daula; his campaign in the marshlands was a failure, but he was more successful against the Kurds ruled by Ḥasanwaih. With psychological shrewdness but appalling cruelty he executed some of the sons of Ḥasanwaih, who had died just before, while at the same time investing others with robes of honour and naming one, called Badr, as Ḥasanwaih's successor. Every flicker of resistance in Kurdish territory was meanwhile ruthlessly extinguished. During this period he entrusted his undertakings in the east to his brother Mu'ayyad al-Daula. There Fakhr al-Daula, to whom Ray had been given in the settlement of 976, had joined the side of 'Izz al-Daula, hoping thereby to carve out an independent territory for himself in northern Iran. After the defeat of 'Izz al-Daula, he had allied himself to the Ziyārid prince Qābūs, and had counted on Sāmānid support, but his hopes were disappointed. At Mu'ayyad al-Daula's approach, he and Qābūs withdrew to Khurāsān, but Sāmānid support was not forthcoming. Only after 'Aḍud al-Daula's death were the princes able to return to their domains.

By the summer of 980 the fighting was virtually over: 'Aḍud al-Daula returned to Baghdad from Hamadān, the ruler of an empire far greater in size than all the previous subdivisions of the Būyid empire put together, and stretching from 'Umān to the Caspian Sea and from Kirmān to the north Syrian border. The old home of the empire, Fārs, was under 'Aḍud al-Daula's direct control, as were Iraq and the newly conquered province of Jazīra. The rest was governed by Būyid princes or by other tributary rulers; Iṣfahān, Hamadān, Ray, Ṭabaristān and Gurgān by Mu'ayyad al-Daula, the senior amīr's brother, Kirmān by his eldest son Sharaf al-Daula, 'Umān and Khūzistān by his second son Marzubān (Ṣamṣām al-Daula), and the Kurdish territory by Badr b. Ḥasanwaih. A Būyid viceroy resided at Mosul. Of the former Ḥamdānid state only the area around Aleppo remained as a buffer between the Būyid Empire and Byzantium, but Aleppo had to recognize Būyid overlordship. In the east, the Ṣaffārids of Sīstān too were now 'Aḍud al-Daula's vassals, while Makrān, the coastal strip on the Indian Ocean, was annexed to the empire from Kirmān. At the centre of the empire the Shāhinids of the marshlands still maintained their position as vassals. 'Aḍud al-Daula's attempt to remove them entirely was in fact his only failure. Iraq had ceased to be an independent province.

Although ‘Aḍud al-Daula did not return to Shīrāz again, it continued to be regarded as the actual capital of the empire, and it was from Fārs that were drawn the civil servants who replaced most of ‘Izz al-Daula’s civil service in Baghdad. These latter, together with the ‘Alid aristocracy, were banished to Fārs. The supreme judge in Baghdad was also dismissed and exiled, and his successor now resided in Shīrāz and was represented in Baghdad by four deputy judges, a decision which infringed the traditional rights of the caliph severely and which also provides an eloquent illustration of the shift of balance from Baghdad to Shīrāz. No doubt ‘Aḍud al-Daula had every intention of himself returning to Shīrāz in due course, as his successors were later to do. The restoration and enlargement of the imperial palace in Baghdad need not suggest that he regarded that city as his principal residence. The main offices of state continued to be located in Shīrāz, and communications with that city were maintained and facilitated by a specially organized postal service, to whose quick and effective functioning the senior amīr attached particular importance.

The reasons for ‘Aḍud al-Daula’s prolonged sojourn in Baghdad were both political and psychological. His new acquisitions had to be consolidated, and they were threatened by the Sāmānids in the east, by a new menace in the form of the Fāṭimids in the west, and by the non-Islamic power of Byzantium in the north. Against Islamic opponents the ‘Abbāsīd caliphate was still a valuable weapon in the hands of whoever controlled it. In the face of the Fāṭimid threat to the caliphate, the presence of a moderate Shī‘ī power in Baghdad which at least tolerated it, must have appeared relatively tolerable to the markedly Sunnī Sāmānids and, after initial reluctance, they had accepted the situation and recognized the caliph appointed by the Būyids. To the relief of the Sunnīs in Khurāsān and Transoxiana the restriction was lifted, whereby the khutba in Friday religious services was said in the name of a deposed or deceased caliph to avoid the name of a caliph appointed by the Būyids, and a more realistic attitude took its place. It is true that ‘Aḍud al-Daula was unable to prevent the Sāmānids from granting asylum to Fakhr al-Daula and his ally, the Ziyārid Qābūs, but Bukhārā temporarily lacked the military strength to be able to undertake an aggressive policy against the Būyids. The caliphate was even more necessary to ‘Aḍud al-Daula for the consolidation of his internal position than as a means whereby to influence Sāmānid attitudes. The majority of his subjects were Sunnī and regarded the caliph as their sole

rightful ruler despite his political impotence; knowing this, 'Aḍud al-Daula had himself formally declared senior amīr by the caliph himself in a solemn ceremony held in the autumn of 977, shortly after his entry into Baghdad. We shall return in due course to the significance of this action and to 'Aḍud al-Daula's conception of the state, which was one which aimed at the coexistence of the caliphate and the senior amirate and ultimately at a merging of the two.

The city of Baghdad, seat of the caliph, also provided an impressive centre from which to conduct the foreign policies to which 'Aḍud al-Daula now began to devote his energies. From Baghdad he initiated diplomatic contacts with Cairo and Constantinople, and a series of ambassadorial exchanges took place with both capitals. The subjects discussed in his negotiations with Cairo were their policies towards the Qarmatīs, the "Holy War" against their mutual enemy the Byzantine Empire, and the question of the 'Alid descent of the Fāṭimids. The Qarmatīs had declared their hostility towards the Fāṭimids before 969 at latest, and quite apart from this they had supported 'Aḍud al-Daula in his war against 'Izz al-Daula. On the subject of the 'Alid origin of the Fāṭimids the senior amīr at first made some concessions but later withdrew his recognition because it was interfering with his policy towards the caliphate and was also liable to create unrest amongst his *Shī'ī* subjects. His policy towards Constantinople was much assisted by his possession of a valuable hostage, the anti-emperor Bardas Skleros who, having failed in his pretensions to the throne, had sought refuge in Islamic territory and was now being held in confinement at the Baghdad court. Constantinople wanted his return at all costs, and thus 'Aḍud al-Daula was able to arrange a favourable truce. His dealings with the Fāṭimids and with Constantinople clearly reveal his reluctance to embark on further exploits in the north and west. If he did cherish further ambitions, these were thwarted by the decline of his health. Symptoms of a serious disease – the sources speak of epilepsy – had first manifested themselves during his campaign to subjugate the east. This may well explain the depressions which clouded the last years of his life, when he was at the height of his power. He died in March 983 at the age of fifty-three; his imperial rule had lasted not quite six years.

'Aḍud al-Daula's greatest achievement was that he continued systematically to further his father's attempts to unify the empire. His success was considerable. Although he did not succeed in building foundations both lasting and stable, the period of his rule must, with

that of his father's, be regarded as the golden age of the Būyid empire, not only politically but culturally as well. The seeds sown in Rukn al-Daula's reign were to grow and be brought to fruition by 'Aḍud al-Daula. The period dominated by these two rulers does in fact differ in many respects from that preceding which had seen the founding of the Būyid empire, for 'Imād al-Daula had aimed solely at securing his own rule and that of his brothers, whereas his successors went further and sought to provide the empire with an ideological basis.

In Iran forces were stirring which were in favour of a restoration of the Iranian monarchy. The Ziyārid Mardāvīj, 'Imād al-Daula's most redoubtable opponent, had already attempted to exploit such traditions, and it was a policy towards which the Sāmānids also tended. Unlike 'Imād al-Daula, Mardāvīj had had a precise conception of the ideological basis of his own power. He used to celebrate the Iranian New Year with great pomp, and he introduced Iranian court ceremonial in his own palace. At audiences he would sit on a golden throne, wearing a crown of *Khusrau*. If we are to give credence to Miskawaih's report, his ambition was to conquer Iraq, with the ancient royal city of Ctesiphon/al-Madā'in, recreate the former Persian Empire and assume the title of *Shāhanshāh*. We are not told what part the caliph was supposed to play in this empire, but the 'Abbāsids would certainly not have derived much comfort from Mardāvīj's aspirations.

At first the Būyids were unusually reluctant to put forward any royal claims. Miskawaih deplores the lack of a royal genealogy in the case of Rukn al-Daula, saying that "in the eyes of the Dailamites he did not possess the authority of an independent ruler". It was under the influence of Ibn al-'Amīd, his vizier, whose father had been vizier under Mardāvīj, that Rukn al-Daula began to acquire a deeper understanding of the significance and requirements of his position, though perhaps the time he spent as a hostage at the court of Mardāvīj may first have aroused his awareness. Now the ideal of a restored Persian monarchy became accepted amongst the Būyids too. Our first record is a commemorative silver medal minted in Ray in 351/962, possibly to celebrate the conquest of Ṭabaristān which occurred that year. On it the senior amīr is depicted as a Persian Emperor wearing a crown; the inscription is in Pahlavī and reads: "May the glory of the King of Kings increase".¹ Indispensable for the support of this claim was the compilation of a genealogy tracing the Būyids back to the Sāsānids, though whether any

¹ Miles, "Portrait", p. 283.

attempt was made in this connection under Rukn al-Daula is uncertain. The frequent choice of Iranian names in the second Būyid generation is however quite striking. The founder of the family bore beside the Iranian name 'Būya' the pseudo-Arab name (or *kunya*) Abū Shujā'. Of the grandfather's names only Fanā-Khusrau is recorded. This suggests that the father was the first to be converted to Islam, and would account for his choice of purely Islamic names for his sons. He behaved in a manner typical of a new convert by calling them 'Alī ('Imād al-Daula), Ḥasan (Rukn al-Daula) and Aḥmad (Mu'izz al-Daula). Rukn al-Daula however returned to Iranian tradition by naming his eldest son ('Aḍud al-Daula) Fanā-Khusrau, and another son Khusrau Fīrūz. The name Fanā-Khusrau is identical with that of the grandfather, who also appears in the fictitious Būyid genealogy which goes back to Bahrām Gūr and was probably only drawn up in its entirety at the court of 'Aḍud al-Daula. We first encounter the complete genealogy in al-Ṣābi's *Kitāb al-tājī*, a history of the Būyid dynasty composed in Baghdad in 980 at the command of 'Aḍud al-Daula. Although its fictitious character was recognized even by contemporaries, it was to be taken over by numerous authors. Moreover, the fact that it was fictitious led to countless different versions; indeed De Slane refers to no less than seventeen in his translation of Ibn Khallikān's biographical work.¹ A late chronicle, that of Ibn Shihna (late 14th century) traces the genealogy as far back as Ardashīr b. Bābak. The likelihood that the provisionally complete version was drawn up at the court of 'Aḍud al-Daula is borne out by the threefold appearance in it of the name Shīrdil, which was the name of 'Aḍud al-Daula's eldest son, who was born c. 960 and later became known as Sharaf al-Daula. This detail provides us with the earliest date acceptable for the completion of the genealogy. Shīrdil was certainly regarded as the successor to the crown, a fact which also explains his hostility towards Ṣamsām al-Daula, who took over the government in Baghdad after 'Aḍud al-Daula's death.

The Būyid claim to kingship runs parallel with that to descent from the Sāsānids. In this respect too, 'Aḍud al-Daula deliberately followed his father's policy both by arranging "suitable" marriages and by assuming fitting titles. Probably as early as his march on Iraq he had already married a daughter of the Dailamite king Manādhār, who may have been descended from the Banū Justān line which had ruled Dailam in the 9th century. As we have already seen, he demanded the title Tāj

¹ Ibn Khallikān, vol. 1, p. 157, note 1.

al-Daula from the caliph immediately after his accession in Shīrāz. When this attempt was thwarted by Mu‘izz al-Daula, he continued his policy with greater circumspection but no less determination. On a coin dated 350/961-2 and minted in Shīrāz, he called himself “the just amīr”, although names and epithets were till then rarely to be found on coins. In fact the epithet “just” harks back to one which had been the traditional prerogative of Persian kings, and the “mirrors of princes” are full of anecdotes illustrating the “justice” of these monarchs of a former age. It is surely no coincidence that this type of literature, with its typical retrospective emphasis on former Persian kings, now became popular again. Three years after the minting of the coin just referred to, the celebrated Mutanabbī visited the court at Shīrāz and in a *qaṣīda* addressed the amīr as “King of Kings”. Although this may partly be explained by his use of poetic hyperbole and by his recourse to flattery in the hope of reward, it nevertheless does reflect the amīr’s conception of his own ambitions and position. But a few years were to elapse before he took up arms in order to wage a series of campaigns which were to lead him to Baghdad itself. After his conquest of Kirmān, he commanded the minting of a coin which bore an exact resemblance both in design and inscription to the commemorative medal struck by his father in 351/962. After the capture of ‘Umān he went one stage further. The title “Shāhanshāh” now made its first appearance in an inscription. Finally, a coin (not a medal) was minted in ‘Umān in 365/975-6 bearing the title “*al-malik al-‘ādil*”. After his assumption of the senior amīrate in Baghdad nothing prevented him from including this title on coins minted in Ray and Iraq as well. When his series of conquests came to an end in 980, he was in a position to crown his achievements with the official assumption of the title “Shāhanshāh”, which was henceforth placed on coins.

This act was preceded at the end of 977 by his solemn investiture in the palace of the caliph, a remarkable ceremony of which al-Ṣābi’ gives a detailed description and background. It places the caliph’s attitude in a new light. ‘Aḍud al-Daula’s exaggerated idea of his own importance had led him to insist on two conditions for his reception at the court of the caliph: he demanded the privilege of riding into the audience chamber on horseback, and the erection of a curtain to prevent any of his followers from witnessing the moment when he kissed the ground at the caliph’s feet, for fear lest this might lessen the esteem which he had so painstakingly built up for himself in Fārs. The caliph however

agreed to neither request. On the contrary, he ordered the erection of a barrier at the entrance of the audience chamber, thereby forcing the senior amīr to dismount and enter it on foot – only to discover the complete absence of the curtain as well. Nevertheless ‘Aḍud al-Daula observed all the prescribed ceremonial and prostrated himself before the caliph, giving one of his followers, who asked if then the caliph were God before whom alone one kneels, the quick-witted and appropriate reply: “Not God, but God’s shadow on earth.” The investiture then took its customary course. After the greeting and a brief dialogue, the caliph pronounced the words of investiture: “It has pleased me to transfer to you the affairs and government of the subjects both in the East and in the West of the earth, excepting my own private possessions, my wealth and my palace. Rule them, begging God to grant you success.” At the request of the senior amīr this formula was repeated before witnesses drawn from both parties. ‘Aḍud al-Daula then received the robes of honour, the diadem, and two banners, whereupon the deed of nomination was read out. This brought the investiture itself to its traditional close. But the senior amīr had requested a special favour to complete the ceremony. When the diadem was placed upon his head, the court officials entrusted with the investiture itself allowed one of his two locks of hair, adorned with a jewel, to hang loose. At the conclusion of the ceremony, according to the agreed plan, the caliph with his own hand fastened the lock of hair beneath the diadem. This was intended to give the impression that he had actually been crowned by the caliph himself, and in order to ensure that all would go well, he had taken two of his most high-ranking officials with him into the chamber where the robes of honour were put on, apparently to make quite sure that the lock of hair was not fastened beneath the diadem. Presumably this detail was a Persian coronation ceremony unknown at the caliph’s court, and the latter had agreed to it unaware of the full significance of what he would be called upon to do. But for ‘Aḍud al-Daula this small detail had very great importance indeed; before the eyes of his companions and therefore in a sense of his subjects too, he had been crowned king by the caliph himself. The title which he had demanded as early as 950, shortly after his accession in *Shīrāz* – *Tāj al-Daula* (“The Crown of the Empire”) – only becomes fully comprehensible in the light of this ceremony. It too was now granted to him, albeit in the altered version “*Tāj al-Milla*”, to avoid the repetition of “*Daula*”.

‘Aḍud al-Daula’s coronation ceremony provides the clue to his conception of the monarchy. It is true that the concept of monarchy had been in essence superseded by Islam, but in practice this was not quite the case, particularly in Iran. There dates were still reckoned by the era of Yazdgard, the feast of Naurūz was still being celebrated, and numerous fire temples were still serving the Zoroastrian cult, and although countless Persians had already embraced Islam, the concept of an Iranian monarchy still had a meaning. It provided the Būyids with a welcome instrument when they came to consolidate their rule both at home and abroad, it increased the respect in which they were held by the Dailamite leaders who had frequently flouted their authority in the past, and it coincided with the “Persian Renaissance” which in northern Iran was just beginning to make itself felt in the domain of literature. Even the Sāmānids, though strict Sunnīs, displayed considerable reverence for the Iranian royal past, especially when it came to genealogies. But ‘Aḍud al-Daula went one step further by obtaining the approval of the caliph, albeit by somewhat devious means, and by claiming descent from the great kings of the past. He was a devout Muslim, and was undoubtedly convinced that the coexistence of caliphate and monarchy would provide a solution for the political and religious problems of the period. Even before his first campaign he must have sensed that he had a vocation; this is something which appears again and again in his surviving official correspondence. It may serve as proof that the ideals which he personified were more than the mere expression of cynical political calculation. In this he was quite unlike Mardāvīj the “unbeliever”, who was the victim of his own megalomania and met a miserable death at the hands of discontented Turkish slaves. Of course the caliph was unlikely to be much impressed by his imperial vocation and the new order it entailed. The senior amīr himself came to realize this only too bitterly, in other words, the investiture meant little to the caliph but to ‘Aḍud al-Daula its significance was profound and all-important. It led him to reward the caliph with the restitution of all his former rights and privileges, with ostentatious gifts and with the renovation of his palace, although he had no intention of thereby suggesting that he regarded himself as in any way subservient. His idea was a division of power between the caliphate and the monarchy, equivalent to the mediaeval European theories of church and empire. His dismissal of the chief judge might therefore appear as an incomprehensible negation of his ideas; more probably it was a

lapse, understandable when one considers how unprecedented his ideas were in Islamic history. Moreover the judge in question had shown that he was likely to be far from sympathetic to the new order contemplated by ‘Aḍud al-Daula. This new conception of the division of power presupposed a mutual exchange of tokens of respect. Thus when ‘Aḍud al-Daula returned to Baghdad from his eastern campaign in 980 he allowed himself to be conducted into the city by the caliph, an event unprecedented in the history of the senior amirate. Once again the caliph seems to have failed to appreciate the significance of the ceremony in which he was taking part. It did however lead the senior amir to conceive a plan which, especially in the eyes of his contemporaries, must have seemed even more unprecedented. He now aspired to unite the two powers in the person of the son to be born of a marriage between his own daughter and the caliph. The marriage took place in the latter half of 980, but the caliph did not consummate it. Similar marriages had often occurred previously, and on this occasion too the caliph declined to see anything more in it than a polite formality to which he ought to consent but which he could always interpret as condescension on his part towards the senior amir. Thus in the *khutba* held on the occasion of this marriage, the amir was reminded that the Būyid dynasty was being done a signal honour by being thus permitted to ally itself with the Hāshimid house in wedlock. The caliph’s cunning thus came to his rescue; from this point on, relations between him and ‘Aḍud al-Daula began to grow decidedly cooler. All that remained of the latter’s idea of the division of power were the ceremonials he had introduced.

The attempt, initiated by Rukn al-Daula and continued by ‘Aḍud al-Daula, to revive the Persian monarchy by reconciling it with the Islamic form of government was ultimately bound to fail. ‘Aḍud al-Daula is not remembered as a Persian monarch. His name was to go down in history rather as a clever, energetic and strong ruler. The title “*Shāhanshāh*” was not to become generally accepted (although the Saljuqs also at first assumed it); instead the wielder of political power was to bear the title “*Sultān*”. It is significant that this title was originally borne by the caliphs; its assumption by the real holder of political authority reveals the extent to which the caliphs had by now delegated theirs. In practice this process had begun long before the advent of the Būyids, from the moment when independent states had arisen in the east and west. The prime concern of the Būyids and above all of ‘Aḍud

al-Daula was to regulate an area in which the caliph had exerted direct influence until their rise to power. Indeed 'Aḍud al-Daula may even be said to have striven to enhance the authority of the caliphate after a phase during which it had been divested of power. It was an enterprise which presupposed the co-operation of the caliph and the complete supremacy of Būyid power. The first was never really forthcoming, and the duration of the second was too short to provide even a temporary answer to a problem which was at bottom insoluble. 'Aḍud al-Daula's proposal to bring both parties together in a personal union was a daring one, but it overlooked certain essential and theoretically influential doctrines concerning the caliphate, since the Sunnī authorities still regarded the office as elective, not hereditary.

In many areas 'Aḍud al-Daula's achievements were great. Nevertheless we ought not to forget those of his father, Rukn al-Daula. Ibn al-Athīr praises the latter as a just ruler, while the verdict of Miskawaih is rather less favourable, since he is apparently at pains to emphasize the achievements of his own patron, the vizier Abu'l-Faḍl b. al-'Amīd, who had served Rukn al-Daula in that capacity from 329/940 to 360/970. At home Rukn al-Daula was faced with two major problems: how to pay the army and how to ward off the incursions of the semi-nomadic Kurds, which were constantly disrupting communications and agriculture not only in their own mountainous area but all over Jibāl. He could not with any confidence embark on a full-scale campaign against them since the Ḥasanwaihids, a Kurdish dynasty, had exploited the confused situation in western Iran in the middle of the 10th century and had built up considerable strength of their own in the area around Hamadān. Rukn al-Daula was compelled to pursue a lenient policy in this direction because he was more concerned with the situation along his eastern frontier. Moreover the Kurds commanded the important route between the Iran plateau and Mesopotamia through which armies from Baghdad would have to pass in order to come to Rukn al-Daula's assistance. Only when the situation on the eastern frontier had been to some extent regulated could he proceed to firmer measures against the Kurds. In 970 he entrusted his vizier with a campaign against Hamadān, but the latter's death brought it to a halt and a compromise solution had to be found. Meanwhile the Ḥasanwaihids continued to increase their power; they were still to have an important rôle to play.

Miskawaih criticized Rukn al-Daula's Kurdish policy and also his liberality towards his troops, though we should not forget that he was

more dependent on their loyalty than were the other Būyids. In this respect matters improved once he had consolidated his power, an improvement which the historian naturally ascribes to his own patron Ibn al-‘Amīd. His complaint that Rukn al-Daula did not concern himself sufficiently with the improvement of the country’s economy does not seem to be entirely justified. Information provided by the *Tārīkh-i Qum* indicates that his initially severe taxation policy gradually became more lenient. We know of an inquiry sent by Rukn al-Daula to Baghdad, in which he requested a description of that city and details of the number of the baths it contained (presumably so as to gauge the size of its population?). It seems likely that he wanted to know about the splendours of Baghdad, which he never visited, in order to reflect something of them in Ray or Iṣfahān. He favoured Qum because its inhabitants were *Shī‘ī*, but it was Iṣfahān that he selected as his provisional capital. As late as c. 344/955–6, long after the capture of Ray, the senior amīr’s harem and treasury were still located in Iṣfahān, and later, when Ray was threatened, the harem was sent back there. The city contained a palace which had originally belonged to the Dulafids of Karaj and had been used by Mardāvīj and then possibly by the Būyids. The extension of the city attributed to Rukn al-Daula was probably begun in 935, shortly after its capture, as was the construction of its new wall, 21,000 paces in circumference, vestiges of which were visible until a few years ago. He had already made the city his residence, and his eldest son Fanā-Khusrau (‘Aḏud al-Daula) was born there the following year. From 938 to 940 he was however forced to abandon the city to the Ziyārīds once again. From 940 onwards he was too much involved in endless wars against the Sāmānīds to be able to devote much attention to the city. When the court moved to Ray, the young Mu’ayyad al-Daula continued to reside at Iṣfahān as a viceroy, a position he was to hold until his father’s death. He had received the *laqab* in 355/965 at the age of fifteen. He too continued to rebuild and beautify the city; indeed most of its extension may probably be attributed to him. He enlarged the palace (*Dār al-imāra*) and it was there that Rukn al-Daula and ‘Aḏud al-Daula resided during their celebrated conference to regulate the succession to the empire in the spring of 976. The extent to which Rukn al-Daula was concerned with the economic welfare of his subjects is revealed by the measures he undertook to improve *Shīrāz* when he spent nine months there in 949 to induct ‘Aḏud al-Daula into his new office. He laid out the canal called Ruknābād after

him, which was still to be seen in Ibn Baṭṭūta's day; it was fed by a spring located near Sa'dī's grave. One of his earliest viziers, Abū 'Abd-Allāh a-Qummī (d. 328/939-40), was responsible for the restoration of the bridge at Īdhaj in Khūzistān, which was particularly well-known in the Middle Ages. The work was carried out by masons from Iṣfahān at a cost, it is said, of 350,000 dinars.¹

'Aḍud al-Daula's achievements in all these fields were however very much greater. Its geographical position preserved the province of Fārs intact during all the strife and confusion of the period, and its ruler was able to devote almost twenty years of peace to the improvement of it and above all its capital, since he was more or less spared the expense of military undertakings. Shīrāz, which had superseded the old royal city of Iṣṭakhr after the Islamic conquest, now began to flourish. Rukn al-Daula's canal had marked the beginning of this process, for 'Imād al-Daula does not seem to have made any improvements but simply to have lived in the governor's palace in which, according to legend, he had found the treasure amassed by Ya'qūb and the Ṣaffārids. It was probably in this palace that the enthronement of 'Aḍud al-Daula took place, but the building was soon to prove too humble for a man of his ambition. The geographer Muqaddasī gives an enthusiastic account of the magnificent edifice which now replaced it.² It was two storeys high and contained no less than 360 rooms together with a library. At great expense 'Aḍud al-Daula also built a citadel, but he did not see fit to fortify the city itself. This was not to be undertaken until the last years of the Būyid period, when Shīrāz was threatened by the Saljuqs. Soon the city was so prosperous that its confines began to prove too narrow. The amīr thereupon founded a new quarter, calling it Fanā-Khusrau-Gird. It was situated on a canal, half a farsang to the east or southeast of the old city. The ceremonial entry of the amīr to mark its completion, on 27 March 965, was commemorated by an annual celebration. The author of the *Nuẓhat al-qulūb*, a late source, states that it was originally intended as a camp for the amīr's troops and was situated to the west, not to the east of the city. Perhaps he was confusing two separate places both founded by 'Aḍud al-Daula, since this camp may well have been on the site of the later Daulatābād, to the west of Shīrāz.

The citadel in Shīrāz and a reservoir in the castle at Iṣṭakhr appear to have been 'Aḍud al-Daula's only military constructions, though we might also include the city wall of Medina, built to discourage the

¹ Schwarz, vol. iv, p. 339 (Yāqūt).

² *Ibid.*, vol. ii, pp. 45-51.

Qarmatīs, before whose appearance there had been no reason to fortify the city; for this wall the sources give the date 360/970-1. All the other buildings erected by him were designed for peaceful uses, either trade, agriculture, religion, or his own glory. First and foremost we should mention the dam situated twenty miles northeast of Shīrāz, which halted the waters of the river Kūr, which had previously flowed into a salt lake some thirty miles away, and diverted them for agricultural use. After Shīrāz the town most favoured by ‘Aḍud al-Daula was Fīrūzābād, which may have been the centre of royal estates. Here he often resided, and he reconstructed it entirely, replacing its old name Gūr by its present one because, so Muqaddasī tells us, “Gūr” also means “grave” and was felt to be a bad omen.

The most important port on the Persian Gulf at this time was Sīrāf, west of Lār, though its prosperity was brought to an end by a disastrous earthquake in 977, after which Baṣra seems to have taken its place. It is said to have been rebuilt in the late Būyid period; if so, the Būyid responsible must have ruled Fārs but not Baṣra, and the most likely would therefore be the energetic Abū Kālījār who ruled Fārs from 1027 to 1044, but exerted only indirect influence on Baṣra itself. Long before the conquest of Iraq, ‘Aḍud al-Daula had taken at least the coastal areas of the ‘Umān peninsula, which were of paramount importance for shipping. At the same time he also attached great importance to the land links between Shīrāz and Mesopotamia, and in particular the town of Kāzarūn, where he built a settlement for traders which, according to Muqaddasī, brought in an annual revenue of 10,000 *dirhams*.

An approximate picture of the structure of Fārs in the early Būyid period may be reconstructed: Iṣṭakhr and Fasā were military bases on its northern and eastern flanks, Shīrāz performed the functions of administrative capital and principal residence of the ruler, Fīrūzābād served as his alternative residence, while Kāzarūn’s importance was primarily that of a commercial centre. In the west, Arrajān occupied a special position. Rukn al-Daula had insisted on keeping it in his personal possession and the revenue from it must have been considerable, since Muqaddasī attributes the following words to ‘Aḍud al-Daula: “I want Mesopotamia for the sake of its name, but I want Arrajān for its revenue.” Moreover Arrajān may be considered as a kind of central residence of the senior amīr at least until Rukn al-Daula’s death, a fact borne out by the peculiar structure of the Būyid empire, by

surviving reports of the city, and by its geographical position. Rukn al-Daula, it is true, seldom visited it, but his vizier, the celebrated Ibn al-‘Amīd, went there frequently, and it was the scene, for instance, of his encounter with Mutanabbī, who was on his way to Shīrāz. Finally, its geographical position in the very centre of the empire was in its favour. If a circle about five hundred miles in diameter were drawn with Arrajān as its centre, it would embrace Baghdad in the west, the Caspian coast in the north, and Kirmān in the east. ‘Aḍud al-Daula did not however give the city much concern. Before becoming senior amīr he had no influence there, and his interests subsequently centred mainly on Baghdad.


What has so far been said concerning ‘Aḍud al-Daula’s building activity and his efforts to develop cities, trade and communications, referred only to the province of Fārs and to the period between 950 and 968. Localities named Tājābād, if connected with him at all, point to the period after 977, for it was only then that the senior amīr received the title Tāj al-Milla; they may therefore be said to provide some evidence that even when he was in Baghdad, he had the welfare of his home province of Fārs at heart. It is hardly surprising that his building activities extended to the areas he acquired after 968. There is however not so much evidence for Kirmān, a report by Muqaddasī being all we have. According to this report, he erected a minaret in Sīrjān (the ruins of which lie five miles to the east of Sa‘īdābād), the summit of which was decorated with ornamental woodwork, probably in the form of a balustrade and canopy for the muezzin. He also built a palace there which appears to have been intended for his viceroy, who was his son Abu’l-Fawāris Shīrdil (Sharaf al-Daula). Sīrjān was more accessible from Shīrāz than the older provincial capital of Bardasīr (present-day Kirmān city), which until then had been the residence of the Banū Ilyās, who had accepted Būyid overlordship. In the later Būyid period the viceroys were to return to Bardasīr, and Sīrjān then diminished in importance.

The constructions undertaken by ‘Aḍud al-Daula in Iraq (excluding Baghdad) and Khūzistān were concerned primarily with the development of trade and communications. Khūzistān was important as a link between Fārs and Iraq, and Marzubān, who was regarded as the heir to the throne, had been appointed as its governor. Since ‘Aḍud al-Daula was particularly eager to establish quick postal services between Baghdad and Shīrāz, he concentrated on improving the roads, though

he did not neglect the waterways. An obstacle to communications by ship was the fact that it was necessary to navigate the dangerous route through the Persian Gulf in order to get from the Euphrates and Tigris to the Kārūn in *Khūzistān*. The senior amīr therefore constructed a canal linking the *Shaṭṭ al-‘Arab* with the Kārūn, which considerably lessened both distance and dangers. On the land route the bridge over the Hinduwān at Ahvāz was restored. At Ahvāz he also ordered the erection of a magnificently decorated mosque, as Muqaddasī reports. The fact that after 968 he turned his attention to religious edifices may well be connected with his new conception of his task as representative of a restored Persian monarchy. The deliberate fostering of Islam was a component part of his new conception, for only thereby could the monarchy be established on a legitimate basis. As has already been indicated, his Iraq campaign seemed in his eyes to be justified by the strong sense he had of his own religious mission. His erection of religious edifices was likewise intended to justify his occupation of the new territories in the eyes of the caliphate. In Baghdad however he did not build any mosques. According to his theories of the division of power, this was the sole prerogative and responsibility of the caliph himself. It is known that during the Būyid period the caliphs, despite their financial difficulties, were able to build mosques. ‘Aḍud al-Daula meanwhile built himself a magnificent imperial palace (*Dār al-mamlaka*) in Baghdad, and drew up grandiose plans for the reconstruction of the city itself, providing house-owners – a strangely modern note – with loans for this purpose. Nevertheless his plans were never to come to full fruition in the few years of his rule in Baghdad, and the city remained in a state of partial decay, covering an area no larger than that of Baṣra.

Two trends may be observed in ‘Aḍud al-Daula’s activities as a builder. Dams, bridges and bazaars served a practical purpose and were designed to bring in revenue, while his other undertakings, mosques included, served an ideological purpose. Indeed even his most practical constructions had an ideological undertone, and by appearing worthy of past rulers, seemed to bear out his claim to Sāsānian descent and to prove his ability to restore the grandeur of the Persian monarchy. This may savour of personal ambition, and indeed all contemporary observers concur in their verdict that, while undoubtedly a great ruler, ‘Aḍud al-Daula was also inordinately vain.

The efforts of Rukn al-Daula and ‘Aḍud al-Daula to restore the



monarchy, and 'Aḍud al-Daula's achievements in both the political and the administrative fields were accompanied by marked emphasis on cultural affairs. Although the Sāmānids had provided a precedent of which the Būyids may have been aware, there can be no doubt that the great flowering of culture which coincided with the apogee of the Būyid empire bore at its outset the imprint of the Arabic-Islamic tradition. At the same time Bukhārā in the northeast was to become the focal point for a synthesis of Islamic and Persian culture, but such a synthesis did not even suggest itself as a remote possibility during the early Būyid period, a fact which may in turn be attributed to various factors, the most decisive being that central and southern Iran had been more strongly subjected to Arab influences than the northeast.

It is open to question whether 'Imād al-Daula and Rukn al-Daula were able to read and write, and their knowledge of Arabic was doubtless limited to the strictly necessary. Yet 'Aḍud al-Daula was to make a name for himself in Arabic literature as a poet and indeed as a stylist of versatility. The vizier Abu'l-Faḍl b. al-'Amīd must be given most of the credit for this remarkable achievement. His father had served the Ziyārid Mardāvīj in like capacity and 'Imād al-Daula first became acquainted with him just after he had been nominated as governor of Karaj. Rukn al-Daula rewarded the father's services by appointing the son, Abu'l-Faḍl, as his vizier in 328/939-40. He was to retain this position for thirty years, until his death. Miskawaih provided a somewhat uncritical but nonetheless fitting epitaph on his cultural achievements in his chronicle *Tajārib al-umam*, where he calls him the finest stylist (*kātib*) of his age. Ibn al-'Amīd excelled in every subject; indeed he was famous as a designer of siege-machines and in this capacity took part in several military campaigns. In 970 he was entrusted with the direction of the war against the Kurdish leader Ḥasanwaih, dying in the same year before he could bring it to a decisive conclusion. Innumerable poets frequented the court of this enlightened and cultured vizier, singing his praises and hoping for reward. In his anthology *Yatīmat al-dahr*, Tha'ālibī enumerates eleven poets in Ibn al-'Amīd's circle, amongst whom is the great Mutanabbī himself, who had deserted the court of Kāfūr for the empire of the Būyids.¹ Another figure at the vizier's court was the philologist Abū Bishr al-Fārisī, who will be referred to later in connection with 'Aḍud al-Daula. It was certainly thanks to the vizier's influence and patronage that scholars

¹ Tha'ālibī, vol. II, pp. 4-8.

and poets were assigned positions of responsibility exceeding their qualifications by Rukn al-Daula. His influence on ‘Aḍud al-Daula was to be of paramount importance, as the latter himself conceded by his habit of calling him by the titles *ustād* (“teacher”) and *ra’īs* (“master”). It may be possible that Ibn al-‘Amīd acted officially or unofficially as the young ruler’s vizier or adviser in Shīrāz. Only later do the chroniclers mention that he had viziers of his own.

Although ‘Aḍud al-Daula was himself the author of occasional verse, he does not appear to have attached much importance to the presence of eulogists at his court at least during the earlier part of his career. Tha‘ālibī mentions a great many in connection with the viziers, but none in his section on ‘Aḍud al-Daula. The ruler was, however, a great patron of literary men as well as scholars. The full range of his patronage was perhaps even more in evidence in Baghdad than in Shīrāz. Here he founded the famous hospital which was called after him and which was to remain the most exemplary of its kind until the Mongol period. To it were called the most eminent and the most successful doctors of the day, so that it soon became an academy of medicine in which research, teaching and treatment were combined. Meanwhile he also sought out the company of the city’s foremost theologians, writers and scientists, and his palace became the meeting-place of learned society.

The Būyids had originally belonged to the Zaidiyya, which was a moderate Shī‘ī movement. It seems likely that they only decided to embrace Islam definitely when they first began to appear on the political scene, or perhaps just before. In the *Kitāb al-tājī* this decision is admittedly dated as far back as the period around 865. The information provided by this work must however be accepted with some caution, for implicit in it is ‘Aḍud al-Daula’s attempt to enhance the glory of his dynasty. It seemed preferable to him to claim that his immediate ancestors were Zaidites than admit that they were pagans. His attitude to the caliphate too is more easily explained if we accept that he had a Zaidite rather than a Twelver Shīa background. At first, however, religious commitment was no great concern of the Būyids and their attitude towards religious and confessional problems was one of indifference, in which practical considerations alone seem to have played a part. The Būyid army was made up of Dailamites and Gīlites (together with Turks and Kurds), and the former, if Muslim at all, were Zaidites, while the latter were Sunnī. Fārs too was, as we have already said, predominantly Sunnī. Thus opposition to the Būyids could easily take the

form of religious loyalty to the 'Abbāsīd caliphate. This seems to have been the only reason why 'Imād al-Daula appointed Christians to some positions of responsibility in his administration, a practice which was to be continued by later Būyids. At the height of his power 'Aḍud al-Daula appointed a Christian to the position of vizier. One may say that in the early Būyid period the religious attitude of the imperial government was one of impartiality. Indeed Rukn al-Daula is reported to have compelled the Shī'īs of Qum to use and pay for the upkeep of the Friday mosque. The official khutba for the caliph was naturally enough detested by the Shī'īs, and they had refused to participate in Friday services; but because the Būyids continued to recognize the caliphate despite the fact that they were Shī'ī, no alteration was made in the khutba. This was however Rukn al-Daula's only concession to the caliphate (though his coins bore the caliph's name). In all other respects he gave the Shī'īs a free hand, thus allowing Qum to develop into the centre of Shī'ī theology. The senior amīr intervened strongly when in 345/956-7 the houses of Shī'ī merchants from Qum were looted during riots between Sunnīs and Shī'īs in Iṣfahān; the fines he imposed were intended to restore the peace rather than to mark the fact that he intended to protect the Shī'īs in particular. In Fārs 'Aḍud al-Daula pursued a similar policy of impartiality and religious moderation. When a civil disturbance broke out in Shīrāz between its Muslim and Zoroastrian inhabitants and the latter's homes were wrecked, he ordered those responsible to be severely punished.

By the end of his life, 'Aḍud al-Daula is said to have been the victim of acute melancholia. He must have realized that even his most brilliant successes could never conceal his underlying failure in both the religious and political fields. His ultimate idea of the division of power within the empire had not come to fruition, any more than had his more immediate hopes of a personal union with the caliphate. Both presupposed the caliph's total renunciation of secular power, and for this the time was not yet ripe. The future was to confirm what was in fact already evident now, namely that the 'Abbāsīds were only likely to lend their authority to a temporal ruler whose policies were definitely pro-Sunnī. 'Aḍud al-Daula, for his part, had begun his career by maintaining what amounted to a neutral attitude in religious matters, though by the end of it, he had found himself forced into attempting to regain the confidence of the Shī'īs. When, after barely six years of rule over the whole empire he died in Baghdad, his successors found themselves

faced with a great many serious problems. It was scarcely to be expected that these problems would be solved by the representatives of a dynasty which would not come out openly on the side of the Sunna, but which also lacked the strength and conviction necessary to bring victory to the Shī'ī cause.

III. THE STRUGGLE FOR 'AḍUD AL-DAULA'S SUCCESSION

After 'Aḍud al-Daula's death the empire was once again faced with what had always been a Būyid defect, the lack of any settled order of succession. The late senior amīr's enemies were relatively harmless, perhaps, but they were still there, and new forces were taking shape in Mesopotamia and the Kurdish highlands. The amīr's eldest son, Shīrdil (born c. 960), had been sent to Kirmān in 968; after 977 he spent some time in Baghdad, but had again been sent back to his province. His second son, Marzubān (Ṣamṣām al-Daula), born c. 963, had come to the fore after the conquest of Iraq, and his father seems to have preferred him to Shīrdil, although he never quite made the final decision of nominating him as his successor. This uncertainty reigned in Baghdad when 'Aḍud al-Daula died. At first Marzubān, who was in the city already, was proclaimed successor to the throne and invested by the caliph. To make quite certain that his designs would succeed, he had kept his father's death secret for a certain time, and had only then arranged for himself to be officially inducted into the office of senior amīr with the title "Ṣamṣām al-Daula". But Shīrdil (Sharaf al-Daula), as the eldest son, naturally also raised claims to the succession. From Kirmān he invaded Fārs, thereby forestalling his brother. Almost at once, the new senior amīr thus found his possessions confined to Mesopotamia, while even there he was compelled to make concessions. A Kurd named Bādh captured the province of Diyārbakr and forced the senior amīr to confirm him in its possession; the latter had to content himself with keeping Bādh out of Mosul.

Shortly after 'Aḍud al-Daula his brother and one of his most loyal supporters, Mu'ayyad al-Daula, also died. Like his brother, he had found it impossible to decide who should be the successor to his considerable possessions. He had remained deaf to the suggestions which his vizier, the celebrated Ṣāhib b. 'Abbād, began to make beginning from 976. This vizier had succeeded Abu'l-Faḥ b. al-'Amīd, who had been put to death on account of his opposition to the imperial policy of 'Aḍud al-Daula. Now, after his own master's death, he

decided on an unprecedented step. Bearing in mind the fact that the Būyid state was still a military one, and that the military aristocracy had an essential part to play in it in consequence, he summoned a gathering of the army, to which he then suggested the nomination of Fakhr al-Daula, who was in exile in Nishāpūr. The army assented to the vizier's proposal, and thereupon Fakhr al-Daula hastened to Gurgān, where the gathering had taken place, and was there proclaimed amīr. In dealing with Fakhr al-Daula, the vizier now revealed similar skill and psychological perception. Until now, he had wholeheartedly supported the policies of 'Aḍud al-Daula; indeed his office as Mu'ayyad al-Daula's vizier presupposed such an attitude. In 980 he had met 'Aḍud al-Daula, who had given him his personal instructions concerning the future conduct of eastern policy. His espousal now of the cause of Fakhr al-Daula did not signify a complete break with the attitude he had held until then, for he was in fact to remain a staunch upholder of imperial policy. It is said that, aware of his value as a statesman, he offered Fakhr al-Daula his resignation, knowing full well that the latter would then agree to his continued appointment on his own terms, namely the continuation of 'Aḍud al-Daula's policy. The first tangible result of this was Fakhr al-Daula's refusal to hand Gurgān back to Qābūs b. Vuṣhm-gīr, the former vassal of Rukn al-Daula, who had been his companion in exile. He then took the opportunity afforded by Sāmānid quarrels over the province of Khurāsān, and began to show his active interest in the east by giving military support to Abu'l-'Abbās Tāsh, who had been deposed by the Sāmānids from the governorship of Nishāpūr. Abu'l-'Abbās Tāsh was however forced to take refuge in Gurgān, and Fakhr al-Daula therefore entrusted the government of that province to him before moving to Ray.

In Fārs and Iraq meanwhile 'Aḍud al-Daula's sons had not yet abandoned their struggle for their father's succession. Three spheres of influence had emerged there since his death. Ṣamṣām al-Daula held Iraq, apart from its southern portion and the northern province of Diyārbakr, which he had lost to the Kurdish warrior Bādh. Khūzistān and Baṣra were in the possession of 'Aḍud al-Daula's youngest sons, Tāj al-Daula and Ḍiyā' al-Daula. They had established themselves there when Sharaf al-Daula invaded Fārs from Kirmān. Meanwhile the latter was fighting on two fronts, against Fakhr al-Daula who had now regained the central section of his father's former territory, and against the two rival states in the west. Along his northern frontier he contented

himself with giving military support to the Sāmānids in their war against Fakhr al-Daula. The two princes in Baṣra and Khūzistān, caught as they were between his rivals Šamšām al-Daula and Sharaf al-Daula, proceeded to acknowledge Fakhr al-Daula as senior amīr. He for his part had reinforced his claim to the title by already assuming that of "king", a step which none of his rivals had yet dared to take. Since he now had two genuine vassals of his own, in Baṣra and Khūzistān, he proceeded to assume the title of "Shāhanshāh", which amounted to an open and unmistakable declaration that he regarded himself as the sole successor to 'Aḏud al-Daula. Coming after the rejection of the Ziyārīds's claim to Gurgān, this was Šāhib b. 'Abbād's second success in his attempt to further 'Aḏud al-Daula's policy uninterrupted.

Despite the successes of Fakhr al-Daula, Sharaf al-Daula was provisionally to prove the strongest claimant to the senior amirate. After successfully recapturing 'Umān, which had seceded to Šamšām al-Daula, he was free and ready to intervene in the west. Early in 986 he occupied Khūzistān and Baṣra, whose two princes took refuge in Ray. Even Šamšām al-Daula was too weak to counter this new threat with any energy or determination. In a peace treaty signed in May/June 986, he was compelled to recognize Sharaf al-Daula as senior amīr. This now reduced the claimants to the senior amirate to two. Sharaf al-Daula declined to enter Baghdad before he had destroyed his rival in Ray. But his plans in that direction were suddenly frustrated by events in Baghdad itself. There an insurrection took place against Šamšām al-Daula, which then led to armed conflict between the Turks and the Dailamites. In order to save Iraq from the Kurds and other powers which might exploit this confused situation, Sharaf al-Daula marched on Baghdad in 987, deposed its ruler, and sent him as a prisoner to a fortress in Fārs. By July of that same year he was solemnly invested as senior amīr by the caliph. His struggle with Fakhr al-Daula was now ready to begin. His first move was planned to be the defeat of Badr b. Ḥasanwaih, who was a loyal ally of Fakhr al-Daula. But not only did this campaign fail to produce the desired victory, death suddenly put an unforeseen end to all of Sharaf al-Daula's plans. He died in Baghdad on 7 September 988 at the early age of twenty-eight.

Sharaf al-Daula left two sons, both of whom were too young to be considered as his heirs. The senior amirate therefore devolved upon 'Aḏud al-Daula's third son, the seventeen-year-old Bahā' al-Daula. He was however unable to take possession of his entire inheritance

immediately, because Ṣamṣām al-Daula, who had been partially blinded shortly before Sharaf al-Daula's death, managed to escape from captivity and take Fārs, Kirmān and Khūzistān.

Fakhr al-Daula in Ray now judged that the opportune moment for action had come. His vizier Ṣāhib b. 'Abbād advocated immediate hostilities to the south and west, and for this the changes of ruler in Shīrāz and Baghdad seemed to provide a favourable opportunity. Accompanied by his vizier, he therefore marched into Khūzistān, with the aim of cutting Baghdad off from Shīrāz. But climate and terrain were against him, and he was obliged to withdraw. This invasion from the north had the result of making the rulers of Shīrāz and Baghdad forget their enmity and draw up a peaceful alliance whereby Ṣamṣām al-Daula confirmed his brother in the possession of Khūzistān and Iraq and himself kept Arrajān, which had already acquired particular importance under Rukn al-Daula, as well as Fārs and Kirmān. Both submitted to the caliph as supreme arbiter, and professed to regard each other as equals. The supplementary title of Ḍiyā' al-Milla which Bahā' al-Daula had assumed on his enthronement, could now no longer be taken as a claim to the senior amirate. Instead both Būyids made use of the title "king" on their coinage and thereby too acknowledged their equality of rank. This turn of events met with the complete approval of the caliph al-Ṭā'i', who even in 'Izz al-Daula's day had advocated the independence of Iraq. But after his fall and the succession to the caliphate of al-Qādir, Bahā' al-Daula assumed the title of "Shāhanshāh" which had been borne by Aḍud al-Daula, and thereby implied that he still aspired to the leadership of the whole united empire and not just an independent Iraq. His prime concern was the removal or at least subjection of his equal and rival, Ṣamṣām al-Daula, who for his part was involved in wars against the Ṣaffārids, who had taken Kirmān almost without a fight after Sharaf al-Daula's death. But Bahā' al-Daula's attack on him met with no success – indeed he now lost Khūzistān, assigned to him in the treaty signed three years before. Nevertheless Ṣamṣām al-Daula also found himself meeting with increasing difficulties, and finally decided that he would recognize the senior amirate of Fakhr al-Daula on behalf of his entire possessions, namely Kirmān, Fārs, Khūzistān and 'Umān. This step produced a situation virtually identical with that which had prevailed during the reign of Rukn al-Daula. The only differences were that Khūzistān now belonged to the east and, more important, that the Būyid rulers of

Baghdad and Ray both laid claim to the same privileges, bore the title of "Shāhanshāh" and had no intention of yielding to each other's superiority. The empire had fallen into two distinct and independent halves.

Fakhr al-Daula was now the ruler of the whole of Būyid Iran, and could turn his attention either towards Iraq, where Bahā' al-Daula was meeting with increasing difficulties, or towards the Sāmānids, whose rule was growing steadily weaker. His attention was in fact to be occupied almost exclusively by the problem of Khurāsān. Once again he tried to wrest the province, this time from the Ghaznavid Sebük-Tegin, the governor recently appointed by the Sāmānid ruler Nūḥ, but once again, as in 984, his attempt failed despite the large forces which he threw into the campaign. This was probably his biggest mistake. Perhaps some of the blame for it may be attached to the vizier Ṣāḥib b. 'Abbād, but when the latter now died, it was obvious that the Būyid empire had lost one of its most able administrators and that the ideal of imperial unity had lost one of its most fervent and loyal advocates. Whatever his mistakes and omissions – and his failure to realize that the future would be settled in Iraq rather than Khurāsān was the most serious – without him Fakhr al-Daula was lost. Two years later he too was dead without having done anything more to affect the course of the empire's history.

While Fakhr al-Daula's attention was engrossed with the war in Khurāsān, Bahā' al-Daula's strength had begun to revive and Ṣamṣām al-Daula's to wane. Soon Bahā' al-Daula, with the assistance of his new ally the Kurd Badr b. Ḥasanwaih, was able to contemplate an invasion of Fārs. But scarcely had this invasion begun in December 998 than Ṣamṣām al-Daula was himself assassinated while fleeing from Shīrāz by one of 'Izz al-Daula's sons who had escaped from captivity and had organized an armed rising against him. This event gave Bahā' al-Daula the opportunity of taking Shīrāz himself, and before long the opposition of 'Izz al-Daula's sons had been completely broken. Nor did Bahā' al-Daula now have any serious opponent left in Ray where, since Fakhr al-Daula's death and during the minority of his two young sons, the regency had been assumed by their Kurdish mother, the "Sayyida". The elder son, Majd al-Daula, was still in Ray, but the younger, Shams al-Daula, had been appointed governor of Hamadān and Kirmānshāh. Both had recognized Bahā' al-Daula as senior amīr by 400/1009–10 at the latest, and this in turn invalidated their earlier assumption of the

title “Shāhanshāh”. Nevertheless Bahā’ al-Daula had to content himself with the title of “king” in Ray – a concession which was of theoretical rather than practical significance. Meanwhile the Būyids were no longer proving strong enough to hold the Khurāsān frontier by force of arms and were being forced to accept the loss of valuable territory in the north and west. Both Ṭabaristān and Gurgān now passed into the hands of the Ziyārids for good, and Qābūs b. Vushmgīr reinforced his position towards the Būyids by entering into an alliance with Maḥmūd of Ghazna which made him virtually the latter’s vassal. In the west, Zanjān and various other towns fell to the Musāfirids of Āzarbāijān. In the south Būyid freedom of movement was equally hampered, this time by the Kākūyids. Shortly after 398/1007 the Sayyida had entrusted the government of Iṣfahān to the Kurdish prince Ja’far ‘Alā’ al-Daula b. Kākūya, who was a cousin of Majd al-Daula on his mother’s side. This prince had soon succeeded in establishing his de facto independence, and later went on to attempt an extension of his influence to Hamadān and Ray.

Bahā’ al-Daula ceased all activity in the north, although the confused situation there and the growing power of the Ghaznavids were making the reinforcement of Būyid strength in Ray more essential than ever. He had entered Shīrāz in 999–1000 and he never left Fārs again. It would seem that he regarded his task complete once he had returned to the capital city of his father and had successfully subjugated his opponents in the east. Perhaps his presence in Iraq would have been even more essential than in the north. There the conquests of ‘Aḍud al-Daula had for the most part been lost again. In Diyārbakr, Bādh had laid the foundations for the future rule of the Marwānids; Raḥba and Raqqa had passed into the Fāṭimid sphere of influence, while in Mosul the ‘Uqailids had established themselves firmly. They, like the Marwānids, gave only nominal recognition to Būyid authority, though this was at least more than Mu’izz al-Daula had ever obtained from the Ḥamdānids. But whereas the influence of the Ḥamdānids had extended no further than Takrīt on the Tigris, the Bedouin ‘Uqailids advanced much further, almost reaching Baghdad in the south and actually including Anbār and Kūfa in the southwest. It was only their internal dissensions that prevented them from providing an even greater threat to the Būyids. The confusion which followed ‘Aḍud al-Daula’s death had presented an admirable opportunity for the Bedouins to further their attempts to obtain a permanent foothold in the fertile regions, and this

was the principal reason for the relative speed of the 'Uqailid advances just described. Bahā' al-Daula, who had spent almost ten years of his reign in struggles with his rival in Fārs, was quite unable to offer any resistance to this wave of Bedouin expansion. By the end of his reign his direct influence in Iraq was confined to Baghdad and Wāsiṭ and the areas immediately surrounding these two cities.

Despite the general confusion which marked the period after 'Aḍud al-Daula's death, and despite the waning of Būyid power which it betokened, the cultural achievements of the Būyid Empire continued. The Būyid princes still found both opportunity and inclination to indulge their scientific and literary tastes. They reverted moreover to the conscious awareness of their Iranian heritage, and western Iran now embarked on the same process which had previously reached such remarkable proportions in the east, namely the deliberate transformation of its Arabic-Islamic culture into a culture specifically Iranian. An important factor in this development was Iran's abandonment of its traditional religion in favour of Islam, which ceased in consequence to be associated with foreign domination and became instead the expression of the religious faith of the nation as a whole. As a result, Arab influence could no longer be regarded as the sole vehicle for the spread of Islam within the confines of Persia, and the Persian language began to permeate court life and to acquire the status of a literary medium. Until the year 1000 however the process of Iranization did not make such rapid progress in Ray and Iṣfahān, where court life was entirely dominated by Arabic-Islamic culture. This was largely due to the cultural and literary activities of the politically even more influential vizier Ṣāhib b. 'Abbād. *Tha'ālibī* enumerates no less than twenty-three poets in attendance at the latter's court and singing their patron's praises in Arabic poetry; moreover he kept up a correspondence with all the leading literary figures of his time. A late source ascribes the restoration of the ramparts of Qazvīn to him, as well as the erection of a palace in that city in a quarter thenceforth called Ṣāhibābād. More often he resided in Iṣfahān, since he was himself a native of nearby Ṭāliqān, and it was in Iṣfahān that he chose to be buried. His death was immediately followed by the confiscation of his property by the impoverished Fakhr al-Daula, who was soon to encounter the opposition of his wife Sayyida who, after his death, took over complete personal control of the government of Ray to the exclusion of her own sons, the elder of whom, namely Majd al-Daula, had been enjoying the most

careful education with a view to his future succession. His tutor had been the distinguished scholar and grammarian Aḥmad b. Fāris of Hamadān, whose most illustrious pupil in his native city was Badī' al-Zamān Hamadānī, the literary precursor of Ḥarīrī, the author of the famous *Maqāmāt*. Ibn Fāris was a Persian, but it is significant that, like the vizier Ṣāhib b. 'Abbād, he was a fervent defender of Arabic against the attacks of the *Shu'ūbiyya* movement, which advocated the cultivation of Persian at the expense of Arabic.

IV. THE DECLINE OF THE BŪYID EMPIRE

Bahā' al-Daula, after protracted efforts, had finally succeeded in restoring some semblance of unity to the empire. He had, however, also witnessed the beginning of the decline of Būyid power in the north and had had to accept a considerable reduction of his influence in Iraq. He died in Fārs in December 1012, in Arrajān, that city which from the start of the Būyid period had been a favourite seat of the senior amīrs. His reign may with good reason be said to fall into two almost equal halves, the first of which extended from his accession in 989 until the turn of the century and was taken up with the struggles for 'Aḍud al-Daula's succession, and the second being the period of his undisputed senior amirate which was spent entirely in Fārs and was marked by the absence of any personal intervention in Iraq or in the north. Shortly before his death he had named his son Abū Shūjā', who was born in 993 and lived in Baghdad, as his successor. According to the custom which by now was hallowed by tradition, Abū Shūjā' was given a double title: Sultān al-Daula wa 'Izz al-Milla. The new senior amīr promptly left for Shīrāz in order to assume the reins of government and to put the affairs of the empire in order. He allowed his two eldest brothers to participate in this by appointing them to governorships: Abū Ṭāhir Jalāl al-Daula (born 993-4), who had been brought up with him in Baghdad, was made responsible for Baṣra, while Abu'l-Fawāris Qawām al-Daula (born in April 1000) was entrusted with Kirmān.

Like his father, Sultān al-Daula regarded Shīrāz as his official residence. He did not even deem it necessary to go to Baghdad to take part in his own solemn investiture; instead the caliph had to send the requisite documents and insignia to Shīrāz. Three years elapsed before he returned to Mesopotamia, and even then he only went as far as

Ahvāz, where he received the governor of Baghdad in audience. In 408/1017-18 he visited Iraq again and revised his relationship with the 'Uqailids. The opportunity which was offered by his absence from Shīrāz was promptly seized by Qawām al-Daula, who now invaded Fārs from Kirmān and occupied the province. In this step he was supported by the Ghaznavids, who had annexed the neighbouring province of Sistān and were now for the first time playing an active part in Būyid politics. Qawām al-Daula's attack was repulsed. Nevertheless it gave the signal for prolonged contentions between Bahā' al-Daula's sons. After these had continued for several decades, the painstakingly constructed unity of the empire was destroyed. Once Qawām al-Daula had been driven out of Fārs, the senior amīr considered the situation there to be stable enough to allow him to return to Baghdad and concentrate his attention on that sector of the empire, one which had been neglected by his father. This undertaking opened with an outstanding success; he actually succeeded in subjugating the marshlands, that area which had hitherto repeatedly defied all attempts to conquer it. But he soon met with a problem which had always been particularly acute in Iraq, the traditional rivalry between the Dailamites and the Turks. The former had always felt more at home in Iran, and Būyid rule in Iraq had therefore tended to depend largely on the Turks. The latter now demanded that Abū 'Alī (Musharrif al-Daula), Sultān al-Daula's youngest brother (born in 1003), be made amīr. Prolonged negotiations resulted in Sultān al-Daula's return to Shīrāz and his recognition of his brother in Baghdad as a vassal with the title of "King of Iraq". When he tried to reverse the situation by force of arms and was defeated, he found himself obliged to resign his authority over Iraq. Musharrif al-Daula now assumed the title of "Shāhanshāh" and declared himself to be Sultān al-Daula's equal. In a final treaty signed in 413/1022-3, the status quo had to be permanently accepted. The three brothers now all held the title of "Shāhanshāh." and there was no longer any "senior amīr" in the traditional sense of the term.

The first to profit from the disintegration of the empire were the Kākūyids of Iṣfahān. After the death of Badr b. Ḥasanwaih, part of the Kurdish territory had been occupied by Shams al-Daula, the ruler of Hamadān, while the remainder had been overrun by the 'Annāzids of Hulwān. Later Shams al-Daula turned to the Kākūyids for assistance in suppressing a rebellion in Hamadān. When he died and was succeeded by his son Samā' al-Daula, the Kākūyids seized Hamadān (414/1023-4)

and proceeded to expel the 'Annāzids from Ḥulwān. Muṣḥarrif al-Daula now intervened. Though the Kākūyids were compelled to withdraw, they managed to hold on to Hamadān and cement their treaty with Muṣḥarrif al-Daula by a matrimonial alliance. The centre of their power Iṣfahān now entered a second golden age, comparable to that which it had enjoyed under Rukn al-Daula.

Muṣḥarrif al-Daula's position in Baghdad had always been precarious owing to the fact that it depended on the good will of the soldiery who had brought him to power. When he died in May 1025, shortly after his rival, Sulṭān al-Daula, who expired in Shīrāz in December 1024, the choice of his successor was once again in their hands. Not until June 1027 did they finally decide for his brother Jalāl al-Daula, rather than Sulṭān al-Daula's eldest son Abū Kālījār, who had meanwhile become involved in a bitter struggle with Qawām al-Daula of Kirmān. But once Abū Kālījār was rid of Qawām al-Daula – poisoned, as the sources relate – he decided to renew his claims to the throne in Baghdad, and occupied Baṣra. Jalāl al-Daula's authority was by now restricted to the area around Baghdad and Wāsiṭ, and he was caught up in chronic disputes with his own troops with the caliph playing the part of a mediator until they culminated in a mutiny organized by the Turkish general Bārstoghan in 428/1036–7. Abū Kālījār seized this opportunity and marched on Baghdad. Though he failed to occupy it, he succeeded in winning recognition as senior amīr, and had coins minted bearing the title "Shāhanshāh". The 'Uqailids and another Arab tribe, the Asadids, preferred however to see a weak ruler on the throne in Baghdad, with the result that they brought about the reinstatement of Jalāl al-Daula. The status quo was thereupon ratified by treaties between the two rival princes, who henceforth ruled over entirely independent states and bore identical titles until the death of Jalāl al-Daula in 1044.

Abū Kālījār might well have become the ruler of the entire empire had his position at home been more secure. But he was faced with problems similar to those of Jalāl al-Daula in Baghdad. His army, which he had begun by handling rather clumsily, was constantly threatening mutiny, and Ibn al-Aṭhīr tells us that he was thoroughly disliked by the inhabitants of Shīrāz.¹ In consequence he preferred to reside at Ahvāz even after he had freed himself from the malign influence of his powerful and cunning tutor, the eunuch Ṣandal. The

¹ Ibn al-Aṭhīr, vol. ix, p. 127.

DECLINE OF THE BŪYID EMPIRE

signing of the peace treaty between himself and Jalāl al-Daula did however allow him to redirect some of his attention to Iran proper, where the influence of the Ghaznavids had been very much on the increase since Maḥmūd had become their leader. He had occupied himself for almost thirty years with campaigns in India, ostensibly to spread the faith but really in search of plunder. In 1029, however, shortly before his death, he crowned his successes with the conquest of Ray, whose ruler, Majd al-Daula, had ironically requested his assistance against his own mutinous troops.

The annexation of Ray by the Ghaznavids produced a new situation in northern Iran. The Ziyārīds of Gurgān lost their independence and were obliged to pay tribute, while Maḥmūd's son and successor, Mas'ūd, who had been appointed governor of Ray, had been quick to lay hands on Iṣfahān and Hamadān as well, forcing the Kākūyid 'Alā' al-Daula to turn to Abū Kālījār for help, though in vain, the latter being already engaged in warfare in southern Iraq. After Maḥmūd's death in April 1030, 'Alā' al-Daula made a futile attempt to regain his throne. He was only to be allowed to return to it when some years later he agreed to become a vassal of the Ghaznavids. But Ghaznavid power in Khurāsān and Ray had already passed its zenith, as was proved by their failure to capture Kirmān. A new force had arisen in the area in the form of the Saljuqs, whose base had already shifted during Maḥmūd's reign from Transoxiana to Khurāsān thanks to the collusion of the Turkish Oghuz nomadic tribes in that region. The rise of the Oghuz Turks was astonishingly swift. Only twelve years after their first appearance in the province they inflicted a defeat on the Ghaznavids in 426/1035. In May 1040 another decisive battle was fought at Dandānqān, south-west of Marv, from which the Saljuqs emerged as the victors. At this point the Ghaznavids disappear from the political scene in Iran; from now on their place was to be taken by the Saljuqs.

V. THE FINAL UNIFICATION AND COLLAPSE OF THE BŪYID EMPIRE

The death of Jalāl al-Daula in March 1044 brought Abū Kālījār unchecked rule over both Baghdad and the eastern provinces, a goal for which he had been fighting for many years. He encountered virtually no opposition. There were no longer any serious claimants to the senior amirate belonging to Jalāl al-Daula's generation, and Fanā-

Khusrau, a son of the Majd al-Daula who had been expelled by the Ghaznavids, was engrossed in waging a losing war to preserve some vestiges of his father's former domains from the ravages of the Oghuz tribes and the Saljuqs. Thus Abū Kālījār's position was all in all by no means unfavourable. Although his ambitions in Iraq had met with no success during Jalāl al-Daula's reign, he had at least taken firm control of Baṣra by appointing his own son as its governor, and he had employed the time during which his rival's power and prestige were waning in consolidating his own authority in Iran. An attack by the Ghaznavids in Kirmān in 422/1031 had been repulsed, and they had been driven out of Khurāsān as well by the decisive victory of the Saljuqs at Dandānqān. The Saljuqs for their part were still busy strengthening their hold on northern Iran, and although Toghrīl Beg had actually appeared in Ray in 434/1042-3 in order to restore order after the province had been devastated by the Oghuz, the situation in Hamadān and Iṣfahān was still far from clear. In Iṣfahān, the Kākūyid 'Alā' al-Daula had died in 1041 and two of his sons were fighting for the succession. The Saljuqs were however not yet strong enough to wrest it from them. Abū Kālījār therefore exploited the unsettled situation and declared his own shortlived nominal authority over it, only to find that both rival claimants preferred to recognize Saljuq authority over both Iṣfahān and Hamadān rather than his own. The situation in Fārs was sufficiently stable meanwhile to allow him to visit Baghdad, there to assume the senior amirate and receive the supplementary title "Muḥyī al-Dīn" ("Reviver of Religion") together with formal recognition of various Mesopotamian rulers, who all agreed in preferring as senior amir a Būyid whom they knew to a Saljuq who might well prove to be less tractable. Such success prompted the Kākūyids to return their allegiance to him, but their action quickly led to violent reprisals on the part of Toghrīl Beg, and in due course Abū Kālījār found himself obliged to follow the wiser policy of negotiating a treaty of peace with his Saljuq opponent, which was duly cemented with the customary matrimonial alliances.

The peace which ensued was however to be broken in that province which had for some time been playing a critical part in the political development of the empire, namely Kirmān. Its Būyid governor placed himself under the command of Qāvurt, who was a nephew of Toghrīl Beg and was to become the founder of the Kirmān Saljuq dynasty. Qāvurt seems to have been acting on his own initiative in this, and

Abū Kālījār regarded himself as entitled to take measures against the treacherous governor for his infringement of the peace treaty. It was to be his last campaign. The governor sent emissaries to meet him laden with gifts as a token of his renewed allegiance. Amongst these gifts was a beautiful girl from his harem who was entrusted with a secret task which she duly carried out. In October 1048 Abū Kālījār expired unexpectedly at the age of thirty-eight after partaking of a dish of roast venison liver.

It was Abū Kālījār's intelligence and perseverance that made it possible for him to unite the traditional territories of the Būyids with Iraq. Virtually nothing is known of his cultural and administrative achievements, or of his religious attitudes. The Isma'īlī missionary al-Mu'ayyad fi'l-Dīn, who was in the service of the Fāṭimids and spent some time at Abū Kālījār's court, claimed that he actually converted the senior amīr. But it is more likely that, true to Būyid tradition, he let his attitude to religious questions depend on political considerations. The supplementary title bestowed on him by the caliph is evidence enough of his ability to change course. Much of the administrative duties of the empire fell on the shoulders of his vizier Bahrām b. Māfinnā, a man of exemplary character and considerable learning, who founded a library of some 7,000 volumes in Fīrūzābād, a city which had been flourishing ever since 'Aḍud al-Daula's rebuilding of it. The senior amīr seems for his part to have resided for preference in Shīrāz, which he had fortified during the tense period of his confrontation with Toghrīl Beg, but which otherwise still owed most of its splendour to the reign of 'Aḍud al-Daula.

The secession of the governor of Kirmān was the prelude to the disorder which broke out after Abū Kālījār's death and which finally precipitated the collapse of the Būyid Empire. Its immediate causes were once again the shortcomings which had always plagued the dynasty: the unreliability of the soldiery and the dissensions amongst the monarch's sons. Abū Naṣr Khusrau Fīrūz ascended the throne in Baghdad with the title "al-Malik al-Raḥīm", but nothing is known of his previous career. Kirmān had already been lost and 'Umān followed in 442/1050-1, but more serious than this was the renewed division of the empire into two opposing halves, Iraq and Fārs. The latter had fallen to Abū Maṣṣūr Fūlād Sutūn, who, instead of concentrating on the more important task of warding off would-be foreign invaders, engaged in a protracted struggle with his rival in Baghdad not so much

to gain supremacy over the whole empire as to maintain his authority in Fārs and extend it to Khūzistān as well. In fact this situation amounted to the resumption of the struggle which had been brought to a provisional end by the treaty between Jalāl al-Daula and Abū Kālījār ten years before. At first it seemed that Baghdad would gain the upper hand on this occasion; but having taken Shīrāz al-Malik al-Raḥīm was forced to return to Iraq because of ill-feeling between the Turks and the Dailamī and also because of the worsening situation there. Nevertheless the senior amīr inflicted a defeat on Abū Manṣūr and his allies in 443/1051-2 and thereby succeeded in re-uniting Fārs and Iraq. But Abū Manṣūr turned in his plight to Toghrīl Beg for help, and on retaking Shīrāz in 445/1053-4 he actually recognized him as his overlord in the khutba, mentioning the senior amīr in second place – proof enough of the Būyid dilemma during this period and Toghrīl Beg's circumspection in dealing with the Būyids and the caliph; official recognition was his prime objective. By receiving seceders from the Būyid camp with all due honour he astutely enhanced his standing. Soon Khūzistān had fallen to him, laid waste by Turkish pillaging, and the 'Uqailids decided to pay him tribute.

This turn of events isolated al-Malik al-Raḥīm in Iraq; the outlook was bleak indeed. But before acting Toghrīl Beg paused to review his position. His relations with the caliph were strained. The latter held him responsible for the plundering and looting carried out by the Oghuz, though he had in fact had the greatest difficulty in restraining them. Moreover the caliph was by no means eager to be freed from the Shī'ī Būyids by the Sunnī Toghrīl Beg as has hitherto generally been supposed; indeed the caliphate was now, at least in Baghdad itself, enjoying power unprecedented in recent history, and this power was increasing in proportion to the Būyids' decline. To exchange the weak senior amīr for the mighty Toghrīl Beg was hardly a course that recommended itself. At this point a brilliant idea occurred to Toghrīl Beg. He appeared in Baghdad in the guise of a pilgrim bound for Mecca, giving out that on his return he would take up arms against the Fāṭimids. The caliph could not but approve of such pious intentions; moreover Toghrīl Beg's arrival in Baghdad on Friday 17 December 1055 meant that the khutba had to be carried out in his name followed by that of al-Malik al-Raḥīm. Magnanimously Toghrīl Beg now consented to regard the Būyid in Baghdad as his vassal, and the caliph wisely recommended the Būyid to his protection. This state of affairs

lasted barely one week. Perhaps Toghrīl Beg had foreseen what would happen; the citizens of the town became restive, accusing the Saljuq soldiers of committing acts of looting and calling on the senior amīr to have them expelled from the city. Summoned to the Saljuq camp for negotiations, the senior amīr was himself accused of being responsible for reprisals against the Saljuq troops and, despite the caliph's protestations, was arrested. Būyid rule in Baghdad had come to an end.

The Saljuqs, however, had not yet overcome all opposition in Iraq. An insurrection against them was now organized by Basāsīrī, a slave who had been a favourite of the former senior amīr. For five years the struggle raged with neither side able to gain the upper hand. After countless vicissitudes Basāsīrī turned for financial and military support to the Fāṭimids and was appointed Fāṭimid viceroy in Iraq. The majority of the Arab rulers in Mesopotamia were in league with him, and at the end of 1058 he actually succeeded in taking Baghdad itself, where the *khutba* was performed in the name of the Fāṭimids while the 'Abbāsīd caliph was removed from the city and interned at Ḥadīṭha on the Euphrates. But Toghrīl Beg was ultimately to prove the stronger. As he marched on Baghdad, Basāsīrī's brief moment of triumph came to an end. The insurrection collapsed, and almost exactly one year after his capture of the city he fled from it, only to be killed in a skirmish nearby.

The Būyids in *Shīrāz* were able to hold out longer than their counterparts in Baghdad. After almost one century of tranquillity, the heart of the Būyid empire had once again experienced the horrors of war during the reign of al-Malik al-Raḥīm, and these were followed by the even starker horrors of Saljuq depredation. *Iṣfahān* and the surrounding country had already suffered severely when Toghrīl Beg beleaguered the city in 442/1050-1. A similar fate was averted from *Shīrāz* by Abū Sa'd, al-Malik al-Raḥīm's viceroy in *Fārs* in 444/1052-3. But in the end the Saljuqs, with their fighting mobility, were to prove superior to the mercenaries of the Būyids, and the rich and unspoilt province of *Fārs* was not to escape their lust for plunder, especially since the rest of the country had already been laid waste by the Oghuz tribes. In 442/1050-1 Alp-Arslan, the future Saljuq ruler, undertook a foray into the province without the knowledge or consent of Toghrīl Beg. A surprise attack on *Fasā* inflicted serious losses on its defenders, and, laden with booty, he withdrew without reaching *Shīrāz*, which had been strongly fortified by Abū Kālījār. But the internal strength of *Shīrāz* was being weakened

by the dissensions amongst Abū Kālījār's sons which had increased in intensity especially after the deposition of al-Malik al-Raḥīm. Abū Maṣṣūr had removed his brother, Abū Sa'd, but had himself been killed in 454/1062 during a revolt led by the Kurd Faḍlūya, who was to become the founder of the Faḍlūyid dynasty which ruled in Shabānkāra (Dārābjird) until the beginning of the 14th century. In the summer of 1062 Shīrāz was finally taken by the Saljuq governor of Kirmān.

The fate of Abū Kālījār's other sons is lost in the darkness and confusion of the ensuing period. Al-Malik al-Raḥīm for his part died in captivity in the citadel of Ray in 450/1058-9. The Kākūyids alone succeeded at least in part in navigating the perils of this period of Saljuq invasion. On the fall of Iṣfahān after a year-long siege, the Kākūyid Farāmurz b. 'Alā' al-Daula was granted the fiefs of Yazd and Abarqūh by the Saljuqs, and he and his successors raised Yazd to a state of relative prosperity until their dynasty died out and was replaced by atabegs in the mid-6th/12th century. 'Aḍud al-Daula's greater example in Shīrāz thus survived in Yazd, as the Kākūyids embellished it, building mosques, canals and ramparts. One of the last of the atabegs who followed them significantly bore the title 'Alā' al-Daula – that title which had once been borne by the founder of the Kākūyid dynasty.

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Volume Editor's Note

The bibliographies printed below are selective and not intended to be complete; in general they include those works used by each author in the preparation of his chapter. It has not been possible to check the source references of all authors, especially where rare editions of texts have been used. As a rule books and articles superseded by later publications have not been included.

The abbreviations and short titles used in the bibliographies are listed below.

<i>AA</i>	<i>Arts asiatiques</i> (Paris)
<i>AESC</i>	<i>Annales: économies, sociétés, civilisations</i> (Paris)
<i>AGNT</i>	<i>Archiv für die Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften und der Technik</i> (Leipzig)
<i>AGWG</i>	<i>Abhandlungen der königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen</i> (Berlin)
<i>AI</i>	<i>Ars Islamica</i> (Ann Arbor, Mich.)
<i>AIEO</i>	<i>Annales de l'Institut d'Études Orientales</i> (Paris–Algiers)
<i>AIUON</i>	<i>Annali, Istituto Universitario Orientale di Napoli</i> (Naples)
<i>AJSLL</i>	<i>The American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures</i> (Chicago)
<i>ANS</i>	American Numismatic Society
<i>ANSMN</i>	<i>American Numismatic Society Museum Notes</i> (New York)
<i>ANSNNM</i>	<i>American Numismatic Society Numismatic Notes and Monographs</i> (New York)
<i>ANSNS</i>	<i>American Numismatic Society Numismatic Studies</i> (New York)
<i>AO</i>	<i>Ars Orientalis</i> (continuation of <i>Ars Islamica</i>) (Ann Arbor, Mich.)
<i>BAIPAA</i>	<i>Bulletin of the American Institute for Persian Art and Archaeology</i> (New York)
<i>BGA</i>	<i>Bibliotheca Geographorum Arabicorum</i> , 8 vols. (Leiden)
<i>BIFAO</i>	<i>Bulletin de l'Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale</i> (Cairo)
<i>BSOAS</i>	<i>Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies</i> (London)
<i>EI</i>	<i>Encyclopedia of Islam</i> (Leiden)
<i>GMS</i>	“E. J. W. Gibb Memorial” series (Leiden–London)
<i>IA</i>	<i>Iranica Antiqua</i> (Leiden)
<i>IC</i>	<i>Islamic Culture</i> (Hyderabad)
<i>IQ</i>	<i>Islamic Quarterly</i> (London)
<i>Iran</i>	<i>Iran</i> (journal of the British Institute of Persian Studies) (London–Tehrān)
<i>Iraq</i>	<i>Iraq</i> (journal of the British School of Archaeology in Iraq) (London)

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| <i>JA</i> | <i>Journal asiatique</i> (Paris) |
| <i>JAOS</i> | <i>Journal of the American Oriental Society</i> (New York) |
| <i>JESHO</i> | <i>Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient</i> (Leiden) |
| <i>JNES</i> | <i>Journal of Near Eastern Studies</i> (continuation of <i>American Journal of Semitic Languages</i>) (Chicago) |
| <i>JRAS</i> | <i>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society</i> (London) |
| <i>JSS</i> | <i>Journal of Semitic Studies</i> (Manchester) |
| <i>MRASB</i> | <i>Memoirs of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal</i> (Calcutta) |
| <i>MSOS</i> | <i>Mitteilungen des Seminars für orientalische Sprachen</i> (Berlin) |
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| <i>NZ</i> | <i>Numismatische Zeitschrift</i> (Vienna) |
| <i>RENLO</i> | <i>Revue de l'École Nationale des Langues Orientales</i> (Paris) |
| <i>RFLM</i> | <i>Revue de la Faculté des Lettres de Meched</i> (Mashhad) |
| <i>RFLT</i> | <i>Revue de la Faculté des Lettres et des Sciences Humaines de Téhéran</i> (Tehrān) |
| <i>RN</i> | <i>Revue numismatique</i> (Paris) |
| <i>SBWAW</i> | <i>Sitzungsberichte der Wiener (Österreichischen) Akademie der Wissenschaften</i> (Vienna) |
| <i>Syria</i> | <i>Syria</i> (revue d'art oriental et d'archéologie) (Paris) |
| <i>WZKM</i> | <i>Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes</i> (Vienna) |
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